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Abstract 
This dissertation analyses the politics of electricity planning in South Africa by reviewing the 
activities and issues advocated by two dominant coalitions seeking to influence electricity 
planning in South Africa (SA) in the period June 2010 to June 2015. There are two policy 
events that are the focus of the research: the Integrated Resource Plan of 2010 (IRP2010), and 
its 2013 update report. The research is mainly concerned with the political influence exerted 
by the identified advocacy coalitions and the political context they acted within, during the 
period under review.  
The research and the analysis of findings has been guided by the Advocacy Coalitions 
Framework (ACF) theory. In keeping with ACF methodology, the research is based on an 
understanding of the preceding 10 to 15 years in order to better interpret current unfolding 
policy events, identify the coalitions and their activities, and ultimately present key findings 
that are based on empirical evidence.  
The narrative seeks to take account of parallel unfolding dimensions which collectively 
portray a noteworthy tapestry: coalition beliefs and activities, and policy events within the SA 
electricity supply sector over time. By the final chapter, it should be clear who exerted 
influence, what their dominant advocacy issues were, whether such influence was evident in 
policy that was promulgated, and what changed along the way.  
Empirical findings provide answers to the following research questions: 
1. From the IRP2010 to its 2013 Update report, which were the dominant coalitions 
seeking to influence planning?  
2. What were the dominant advocacy issues raised by these coalitions?  
3. What evidence could be found for how the issues of dominant advocacy coalitions 
were realised in electricity policy?  
4. What can be concluded and what are the implications for future electricity planning? 
The dissertation begins with a brief introduction of what the theoretical framework ACF 
would consider the energy policy system i.e. the international and the national energy and 
electricity governance context. ACF is then applied to understand the politics of electricity 
planning in South Africa, two dominant advocacy coalitions active within that sub-system, 
and their advocated beliefs, in order to answer the first two research questions.  
Chapter 5 and 6 together answer research question 3. In chapter 5, ACF is applied to 
understand process and outcomes for the IRP2010 as promulgated. Chapter 6 considers the 
process and outcomes related to the IRP’s 2013 update report which is not recognised in 
policy, and describes some of the shifts that occurred within and between coalitions and 
within the electricity policy sub-system by June 2015.  
The picture that emerges is that of an electricity sector within a new democracy that has 
sought to move beyond its apartheid-era policy legacies and has become characterised by 
decision-making based on politics rather than evidence. It is concluded that recent decision-
making and planning processes in South Africa’s electricity sector have undergone distinct 
periods of open and closed consultative process. It is found that there has been a steady 
opening up of process particularly during the policy period up to December 2010. From 2011 
onward, a closing down of process has steadily been underway, particularly in relation to the 
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IRP2013 update report. This has occurred at the same time as broad public support for 
transparent decision-making that is based on evidence had grown.  
While the analysis focuses on issues of ideological belief, politics and process, rather than on 
technology and economics, it was found that two distinct and contested electricity supply 
investment options related to power sector reform have dominated the advocacy beliefs and 
actions of the two coalitions reviewed, as well as the policy choices made by government: 
nuclear power on the one hand, and renewable energy on the other. These supply options and 
some of the issues of political economy associated with them are considered in the latter parts 
of the dissertation.  
A summary of the main findings  
1. Two high-level coalitions have dominated the IRP2010 process and its 2013 update: one 
favouring orthodox solutions to power supply, and the other favouring transition to a 
reformed power sector. 
2. The coalitions are:   
a. The Orthodox coalition: enjoying both greater political support for and capacity to 
influence the achievement of conventional economic growth. Their advocacy 
tended to focus on past experience and retaining the power supply status quo.  
b. The Reform coalition: less politically influential, and enjoying less political 
support. Their advocacy tended toward learning from past experience and 
changing the status quo. 
3. Among the issues which the two coalitions differ on, the five most contested issues were: 
tariffs and investment, power sector reform, climate change, nuclear power, and 
renewable energy. 
4. The promulgated electricity plan reflects wins and losses to both coalitions. For the 
IRP2010, more evidence was found of policy ‘wins’ for the Orthodox coalition. For the 
2013 update report, more evidence was found of policy ‘wins’ for the Reform coalition, 
Nevertheless, given that the 2013 update report is not recognised in policy, it is concluded 
that the Orthodox coalition has been more influential in its advocacy. 
5. For the IRP 2013 update report, analysis of policy wins and losses became more complex, 
with alliances shifting within and between the two coalitions under review. 
6. Evidence has been found of an initial steady opening up of public consultation process in 
the decade preceding 2010, which later closed down steadily by June 2015. The closing 
down of process has been most evident to those involved in electricity planning, since 
mid-2010. 
7. The influential role of the Presidency, on the nuclear investment decision is perceived by 
electricity planning stakeholders to have begun in June 2010. 
8. The clear political support for nuclear procurement has resulted in greater unified 
advocacy against nuclear power, and lesser advocacy against renewable energy.  
9. The continued non-recognition of the IRP2013 update report in policy has benefited both 
wind power investment and new nuclear power procurement.  
10. Ultimately, the delay in the promulgation of a well-regarded, technically robust updated 
IRP threatens confidence in electricity planning process and is perceived by senior 
electricity actors to be entrenching a situation where politics is currently playing a more 
influential role than evidence, in South Africa’s electricity planning. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
At the time of writing (August 2016), the Integrated Resource Plan of 2010 (IRP2010) is 
South Africa’s official Electricity Plan. Promulgated in April 2011, in policy, it is formally 
located as a subset of the country’s Integrated Energy Plan (IEP) which covers all sub-sectors 
of energy, including liquid fuels. In policy, the IRP is meant to be guided by the IEP, and 
provide policy direction for demand-based expansion of the national electricity supply 
spectrum over a defined period (DoE, 2010a). In practice, the IEP follows the IRP in terms of 
policy direction (Interviews1). Currently the defined planning period is 2010 to 2030. In 
keeping with policy, the IRP2010 was updated in 2013, with a draft report made available for 
public comment. However, this update has not been recognised in policy and no further 
updates have been provided.  
The long-term planning goal for IRP2010 is to ensure sustainable development considering 
technical, economic and social constraints as well as externalities. Its short-term purpose is 
the identification of the requisite investments in the electricity sector that maximise the 
national interest at minimum present-day cost (DoE, 2010a). Government’s commitment is 
thus to growing access to energy in both the short term and the long term.  However as one of 
the most unequal countries in the world, access to energy in South Africa continues to be 
bedevilled by major developmental challenges (Baker et al. 2015). These challenges emanate 
to a large extent from legacies of Apartheid government-led social oppression and division, 
inter-generational economic inequality, and decades of a lack of access to services such as 
basic health care and quality education, manifesting in ongoing high levels of social inequity, 
violence, crime and unemployment in democratic South Africa (Wilson, 2009). According to 
the 2011 Census, 40% of South Africans of employable age were unemployed in 2010, many 
of whom had given up on the hope of ever finding work, with the majority under 35 years of 
age.   
At the core of South Africa’s energy-intensive economy lies its electricity sector. Most of 
South Africa’s electricity is derived from coal. Specifically, coal-fired power plants account 
for 85% of installed capacity and 92% of national electricity generated (DEA, 2014; IEA, 
2014), making a significant contribution to the country’s economy. Coal use contributed 
approximately 45% of the country’s emissions in 2010. South Africa is ranked 14th highest 
greenhouse gas emitter in the world (DEA, 2014). In addition, the power sector directly uses 
approximately 2% of national water resources and indirectly, pollutes an even greater share 
of water resources (Zipplies, 2008).  
Electricity generation is dominated by Eskom, the wholly state-owned national utility, a 
vertically integrated monopoly which also owns and operates the national electricity grid. 
Eskom supplies about 95% of South Africa's power and is financed by net financial market 
liabilities and assets as well as reserves. While Eskom does not have exclusive generation 
rights, it has a practical monopoly on bulk electricity. It also operates the integrated national 
high-voltage transmission system and supplies electricity directly to large consumers such as 
mines, mineral beneficiators and other large industries. In addition, it supplies electricity 
                                                 
1 The reported experience of all respondents. See Chapter 2, “interview methodology and analysis of findings” for a 
description of how respondent feedback is presented throughout the dissertation. 
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directly to commercial farmers and, to a large number of residential consumers. It sells in 
bulk to municipalities, which in turn distribute to consumers within their boundaries2. 
Increasing electricity tariffs along with declining value in international commodity markets 
has reduced South Africa’s capacity to compete internationally since at least 2008 
(Interviews3). Between 2001 and 2011, electricity tariffs increased by 378% (Abrahams et al, 
2013; Trollip et al, 2014). At the same time, the era of cheap coal and electricity has ended at 
a time when global pressure to reduce carbon emissions is growing.  
Electricity governance  
The term “governance” refers to the spectrum of influence over policy-making and planning 
which is made up of public and private actors and institutions (Goodin, 2006). In South 
Africa this spectrum is complex: while the Department of Energy (DoE) holds formal 
responsibility for setting energy policy and undertaking all related planning, the Department 
of Public Enterprises (DPE) has oversight responsibility for the national utility Eskom and is 
its principle shareholder. Both are accountable to their respective Ministries which are in turn 
accountable to the Cabinet.  
The National Energy Regulator (NERSA) was established in 2004 to determine electricity 
tariffs, set the conditions under which electricity may be sold, imported, exported and traded 
and approves licences for generation, distribution and transmission. NERSA and DoE both 
report to the Minister of Energy while the National Treasury monitors Eskom’s financial 
exposure. Eskom is responsible for balancing power supply and demand, managing grid and 
system stability, monitoring and managing system risks and providing real time information 
on the power system.  
Other concerned government actors include the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA), 
local governments (metropolitan, district and local municipalities), and the inter-ministerial 
Energy Security Sub-committee located in the Presidency. Beyond government, influential 
stakeholders include the Energy Intensive Users’ Group (EIUG)4, the Chamber of Mines, the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC)5, and members of the 
international community like development institutions and agencies who offer (often 
conditional) both financial and human resources. Less influential stakeholders include 
members of civil society, the academy and the informal commercial sector (Interviews6).  
Although the DoE is responsible for energy planning and NERSA for regulation, Eskom has 
the longest standing track record and in-house planning expertise (Marquard, 2006). In 
practice therefore, Eskom conducts the research and provides the necessary information to 
inform policy and planning; Eskom project-managed the IRP2010 process (Interviews7; 
Researcher records) and the DoE invited stakeholder inputs in two rounds of consultation 
                                                 
2 Eskom website: www.eskom.co.za. 
3 Respondents 5, 8, 14, 15 
4 The EIUG is made up of 36 member companies including the five largest coal mining companies in South Africa. 
5 Extract from NEDLAC website: At NEDLAC, government, organised business, organised labour and organised 
community groupings gather at national level to debate and aim to reach consensus on issues of social and economic policy, 
to make economic decision-making more inclusive, and to promote the goals of economic growth and social equity. 
6 Respondents 1 & 2, 5-8, 21-24. 
7 Respondents 1 & 2, 5-8, 21-24. 
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before making recommendations to the Minister who in turn sought Cabinet approval for the 
IRP2010 to be signed off by the President and promulgated. This research has found that the 
2013 update report did not enjoy a similar level of public engagement and transparency. The 
draft update report was published on the DoE’s website, some of the key findings were 
presented at Integrated Energy Planning (IEP) public hearings held by the DoE. While public 
comments were invited, the DoE never reverted with a finalised update report. The draft 
update report remains available on the DoE website in that form, and the promulgated 
IRP2010 continues to guide electricity planning. 
Electricity legislation and policy 
The National Energy Act 34 of 2008 is meant to ensure diverse, sufficient, affordable supply 
in support of economic growth and poverty alleviation. The sector is regulated by the national 
Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006 and the Electricity Regulation Amendment Act 28 of 
2007, both of which form the legal basis for the IRP and outline the responsibility and 
authority of NERSA. Policies include guidelines for the electrification of so-called 
‘unproclaimed areas’, electrification bulk infrastructure, pricing, free basic electricity and 
free basic alternative energy policies. Alongside policy, a number of policy guidelines and 
specific regulations have been established over time: on new generation capacity, 
electrification, pricing, free basic electricity, and free basic alternative energy. The Integrated 
Resource Plan of 2010 is the country’s official Electricity Plan (DoE, 2010a). 
The political forces influencing electricity planning 
Since the 1990s, the global electricity industry has undergone significant change (IEA, 2015). 
With growing awareness of climate change and links between power generation technologies 
and greenhouse gas emissions, political pressure is being exerted by many countries’ citizens 
and economies are increasingly shifting away from unsustainable, fossil-based energy 
resources toward sustainable and renewable resource use. In South Africa, the growing ripple 
effects of these wider energy sector changes have also been felt.  
The advent of democratic government in 1994 was accompanied by socio-economic and 
socio-political activities and decision-making shifting from being accepted as a state-
dominated domain towards one guided by greater public participation, and greater insistence 
on accountability and transparency and that is guided by a widely respected Constitution that 
was adopted in 1996 (Wilson, 2009). While such changes have many benefits, decision-
making has also become more complex. Democratic decision-making is often slow, and it is 
challenging to retain consistency throughout processes that often span extended periods of 
time, accompanied by rapidly changing social, economic and political events and contested 
priorities.  
Broad energy planning, investment and power sector planning in South Africa is treated with 
high strategic value politically, economically and socially. The state’s policy choices, the 
economic effects of unreliable power supply, the increasingly common delays and lack of 
transparency that characterise updating policy, as well as the pros and cons of privatisation of 
the national utility are all subjected to vocal and contested debate in the media and among 
ordinary South Africans. All interviewed respondents felt that the Energy portfolio is one of 
the most strategic among government ministries, second only to Finance. Political influence 
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is a broad ambition that extends to all levels of South African society, and this is seldom 
more evident than within the electricity sector.  
Issues of contestation in relation to broad energy supply, particularly as these relate to climate 
change, jobs and economic growth occur not only between coalitions, but within the ruling 
party and the Tripartite Alliance made up of the African National Congress (ANC), the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist 
Party (SACP) (Baker et al, 2014). This kind of contestation and the decision-making that 
emerge have long term strategic effects that in turn pose potential threats to long-standing, 
powerful financial interests within what Fine and Rustomjee (1996) have described as the 
country’s minerals-energy complex (MEC).  
All of the respondents interviewed for this dissertation agreed with the view that decisions 
taken within the electricity sector, particularly for large-scale and long-term investment, can 
have a direct influence on prospects for economic growth, and an indirect effect on the 
capacity for public spending on other pressing socio-economic (and indeed other energy) 
needs. Thus it is understood by all respondents that electricity investment choice that is 
unaware of wider economic and environmental effects can result in market failures like 
infrastructure investment lock-in, long-term sovereign debt, and continued tariff escalation. 
In addition, it is understood that given its power contribution in the region, electricity 
planning choices made in SA can have serious knock-on effects for relationships with 
neighbouring countries.  
At domestic industrial policy level, it is also understood by respondents that SA electricity 
policy has long-standing and powerful roots within the MEC. MEC refers to a constantly 
evolving system of production and consumption based on cheap coal coupled with cheap 
labour used to generate cheap electricity and providing input into, within and between South 
Africa’s energy, mining and minerals beneficiation sectors. This system is mirrored by an 
interconnected industrial elite comprising both private capital and state actors (Fine & 
Rustomjee, 1996). The SA electricity sector is thus understood to be located within a broader 
range of historically contested, unequally influenced terrain of power interlinked with 
important areas of national and regional development – present and future. As such it is an 
area of planning that is highly politicised within South Africa, with many facets that remain 
opaque to the general public. Who gets to decide, how decisions are arrived at, and on what 
basis, is often quite unclear and government accountability is perceived as low8. 
Research questions 
In the context of the electricity supply system, governance and political forces described 
above, the dissertation sets out to answer the following research questions: 
1. From the IRP2010 to its 2013 Update report, which were the dominant coalitions 
seeking to influence planning?  
2. What were the dominant advocacy issues raised by these coalitions?  
3. What evidence could be found for how the issues of dominant advocacy coalitions 
were realised in electricity policy?  
                                                 
8 View held by a majority of respondents from both coalitions. See Chapter 2, “interview methodology and analysis 
of findings” for a description of how respondent feedback is presented throughout the dissertation. 
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4. What can be concluded and what are the implications for future electricity planning? 
Before turning to the methodology used to answer these questions in Chapter 2, the research 
is located within the existing literature on electricity planning.  
Locating the research within the literature 
Existing literature concerned with electricity planning mainly focuses on technical aspects. 
This includes a focus on IRP methodologies e.g. economy-wide modelling, technical 
feasibility in developing countries, international and local best practice (Malik & Sumaoy, 
2001; Graeber & Spalding-Fecher, 2000; Borchers, 2000; Steyn, 2001; ERC, 2013). By 
comparison, less research has focused on the politics or the political economy of electricity 
supply (Nakhooda 2010; Baker, 2011; Roux 2012; Baker et al, 2015) and at the time of this 
research, no research specifically of the politics of events related to the IRP’s 2013 update 
report was found.  
Power sector reform has been a part of the discourse in South Africa since the late 1990s: in 
1998 the Energy Policy White Paper (EWP) first formally introduced the idea of ‘market 
reform’ within the SA electricity sector. It drew attention to the importance of research and 
development of alternative and renewable energy resources and energy efficient technologies 
(DME, 1998). This policy process was recognised by a majority of respondents as part of a 
pioneering period of open public consultation for energy planning. Eberhard has published 
the bulk of literature available on this topic (Eberhard, 2007; Gratwick & Eberhard, 2008; 
Eberhard, 2010; Eberhard & Gratwick, 2010). In 2010, Pickering produced a report on the 
likely functions of the government-proposed independent system operator (ISO) to balance 
daily supply and demand. Relevant to this dissertation, the report provides valuable insight 
into electricity sector political context at the time and provides early perspective on 
independent power producer potential as well as including detailed consideration of technical 
aspects of distribution, power and generation sector reform. 
Marquard (2006) produced a comprehensive and seminal study of the origins and 
development of South African energy policy. His PhD thesis on this topic included 
consideration of the electricity sector and proved an invaluable preparatory resource for this 
research, both for historical perspective and important early insight into the application of 
theoretical frameworks.  
Trollip, Butler, Burton, Caetano & Godinho (2014) investigated energy security in South 
Africa for the Mitigation Action Plans and Scenarios (MAPS) project. The paper provides 
valuable historical narratives and perspectives on energy security generally and provides 
comprehensive insight into the contribution of the electricity sector to the country’s energy 
supply crisis. It covers several issues raised by this research, but not necessarily covered in 
similar depth: tariffs, reserve margins, independent power producers, and the continued 
electricity insecurity of poor households.  
The research which relates most directly to the substance of this dissertation has been 
conducted by UK-based researcher Dr Lucy Baker. Her PhD thesis published in 2012, 
enquired into the political economy of socio-technical transitions in SA’s electricity sector 
and considered the power shifts (both technical and political) under way. In addition, Baker 
has subsequently produced two journal articles based on her PhD, one of which focused on 
the politics of electricity planning (2016) and another which presented a case study of SA as 
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part of a broader consideration of the political economy of energy transitions (2014). All 
three publications have informed the selection of research questions and scope for this 
dissertation and later assisted the analysis of research findings. 
While this dissertation was being written up, Baker et al. (2015) produced a review of the 
political economy of decarbonisation of SA’s electricity sector. Although focused on 
decarbonisation, the report included consideration of the IRP and dominant coalitions that 
were useful to triangulation of research findings.  
Finally, Grové Steyn’s PhD thesis (2001) on decision-making and risk in SA’s electric power 
sector provides important seminal insight into the associated risks of inflexible technology 
investment, the problems of moral hazard, information asymmetry and planning in 
uncertainty, which both informed research analysis and preparation for the concluding 
chapter of the dissertation. 
Electricity policy advocacy coalitions themselves have produced a number of assessments 
related to the IRP2010 and its update. Throughout the research, grey literature was gathered 
from electronic sources as well as willing actors prior to, during, and after interviews. The 
researcher reviewed many brochures, reports, newspaper and on-line articles and transcripts 
of media interviews reflecting a variety of advocacy perspectives. From these materials, the 
views of two high-level advocacy coalitions interested in the allocations of, assumptions of, 
and policy signals for orthodox or reformed power supply in particular, have emerged 
empirically, as dominant. A list of the reviewed grey material is included at the end of the 
formal list of references. 
The Department of Energy website9 serves as a comprehensive online database of the IRP 
process, with all draft copies of the policy, related regulations and policies, technical 
resources on input parameters, information for participants wishing to engage in the 
consultation process and stakeholder presentations from public hearings held in Cape Town, 
KwaZulu-Natal and Johannesburg during 2010.  
In addition to the resources cited throughout the dissertation, the researcher’s preserved 
records for 2010 to 2015, provided some reminders of context and detail throughout the 
research. 
 
  
                                                 
9 www.doe-irp.co.za 
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Chapter 2: ACF, its application and the research scope 
First, the guiding theoretical framework ACF is introduced along with a brief indication of 
how the framework has been applied in the research methodology. The six key elements of 
ACF are highlighted, as these have guided the overall research, before the specific 
methodologies for identifying coalitions and conducting interviews is outlined. Finally, 
clarity is provided on what has been included and what excluded in the research scope.   
The Advocacy Coalitions Framework  
Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith developed the ACF as a theoretical framework to 
describe and explain a complicated policy-making environment which: 
• contains multiple actors and levels of government; 
• produces decisions despite high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity; 
• takes years to turn decisions into outcomes;  
• and processes policy issues in very different ways e.g. some issues involve intensely 
politicised public disputes containing many actors, and other issues are treated as 
technical and processed routinely, largely by policy specialists, out of the public 
spotlight (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999) 
While ACF seeks to be a general framework for analysis of policy and policy change, it has 
typically been described as a theory (Schlager, 2007) and is often applied alongside two other 
theoretical frameworks: Multiple Streams and Punctuated Equilibrium, as “leading 
contemporary theories of the policy process” (Grossman, 2014). Most applications of ACF 
have dealt with energy and environmental policy in the United States, Canada and Europe. 
Substantive topics have included nuclear security, air pollution, marine protected areas and 
climate policy.  
Sabatier’s ACF flow diagram (2007) provides a useful overview of the theoretical 
framework, locating its key elements and their connections, as shown in Figure 1.  
In practice, movement within the framework is dynamic and often non-linear. Not all aspects 
will be clearly evident in all cases, nor will policy events necessarily always include all 
elements. However, understanding the likely variables in play and drawing conclusions on 
how they relate to one another can inform policy analysis and guide research. 
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Figure 1: Flow diagram of the Advocacy Coalition Framework10 
 
Advocacy coalitions include policy participants that both share similar policy core beliefs 
manifest through selected issues, and engage in a nontrivial degree of coordination (Sabatier 
& Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Within policy coalitions there may be actors known as ‘policy 
brokers’ who seek to find reasonable compromise between differing coalitions and within the 
coalitions themselves (Sabatier & Weible, 2005). 
In theory, once policy decisions are taken and policy promulgated e.g. the IRP2010, the 
policy sub-system continues with routine policy-making including relatively minor policy 
change e.g. the IRP2010 update process. In such cases, monitoring of implementation is also 
meant to be routine. The broader system includes factors which are relatively stable such as 
social values and the broad constitutional structure. External system events, also referred to 
as ‘shocks’ sometimes prompt policy sub-system instability which in turn can prompt rapid, 
major policy change. These can include events such as the global financial crisis of 2008, 
Fukushima in 2011 or an enforceable global climate regime which has direct domestic policy 
effects. Such events can also prompt coalitions to revisit their policy core beliefs, particularly 
in the case of monumental ‘failure’ of policy realisation and sometimes can result in 
departure to a new coalition. As has been pointed out above, in practice, movement within the 
framework is dynamic and often non-linear. 
Critique of ACF 
The research revealed no application of ACF within a developing economy, or newly-formed 
democratic context. In such contexts, policy development would be far less linear and 
therefore scientifically trackable, civil society may be engaging with policy in more diverse 
methods, and post-revolutionary government would be grappling with shifting from a 
revolutionary movement, to the application of good governance.  
                                                 
10 The sources of Figures and Tables in this dissertation are identified by references as above; where no source is identified, 
it is an original figure prepared for this research. 
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A further limitation of ACF is that it requires a perspective based on observation of a decade 
or more, in order to understand the influential dimensions of policy change. In practice this 
can be both time-consuming and costly as the work would typically involve extended time 
series analysis of observation, questionnaire and interview data (Sabatier & Weible, 2005) 
and require substantial resources beyond what is available to a mini-thesis such as this one.  
Critics of ACF have also pointed out the difficulties of applying ACF e.g. where a decadal 
perspective is not possible, that definite coalitions are not always identifiable and that even 
within coalitions where members share beliefs, distribution of advocacy efforts will not be 
equal (Blomquist & Schlager, 2000) and thus difficult to measure scientifically.  
Understanding exactly how advocacy coalitions access and use resources and apply strategies 
requires extensive field interviews with actors over an extended period of time (Weible & 
Sabatier, 2009), a level of research that lies beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
Given the limitations of resources, time and the requirements for a mini-thesis, the researcher 
has applied ACF as simply and consistently as possible: by preparing to usefully study 
electricity planning events and actions, focusing on the elements identified by ACF; and 
applying ACF in order to analyse research findings. The research has been based on semi-
structured interviews conducted over a period of three years (with a minority of documented 
prior work by the researcher being included where suitable), a review of primary and 
secondary publications covering the previous decade (drawing on the prior work of scholars 
who have investigated these in detail), and analysis of the policy events themselves, through 
consideration of the advocated beliefs of two coalitions through two key policy events. The 
dissertation includes analysis of how these beliefs were ultimately reflected in policy, the 
conclusions that can be drawn and implications for electricity planning. 
The six key ACF elements that guide reliable policy analysis 
These ACF components have served to guide the research throughout, as well as the analysis 
of findings in order to ensure that reliable conclusions may be drawn: 
1. Understanding of the policy subsystem: the coalitions, issues, actors, policy brokers, 
rules, strategies, policy impacts and policy outputs. 
2. Identification of the short-term constraints and resources of sub-system actors.  
3. Recognition of external system events: socio-economic, socio-political, related policy. 
4. Understanding of relatively stable parameters: the rules, basic attributes of the 
problem. 
5. Consideration of long term coalition opportunity structures: how policy change has 
happened. 
6. Analysis of advocacy result(s): what has been included in policy, what has been 
excluded? 
All of these components have been considered throughout the dissertation and have provided 
a useful ‘spine’ and checklist for consistent application of ACF.  
Methodology for identifying the coalitions 
Advocacy coalitions were selected on the basis of the expressed common issues or beliefs 
they aligned themselves with formally or informally, and whether they co-operated: formally 
or informally. As described on page 6, initial identification of the coalitions was based on a 
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draft list compiled by the researcher through literature review and in preparation for 
interviews. The finalised list of coalition members and their issues evolved throughout the 
research, and benefited from respondent feedback, confirming the researcher’s selection.  
The analysis of two distinct coalitions, their advocacy issues and the final list of coalition 
members has thus benefited from respondent feedback. A map of general advocacy issues 
raised within the sector also emerged from this process but was not analysed. It is included 
here for broader contextual clarification purposes only. 
Interview methodology and analysis of findings 
Findings from interviews with senior actors representing a diverse range of political agendas 
for the IRP2010 and 2013 update process were combined with the primary and secondary 
literature analysis already described above. Initial findings were then shared with a small 
number of experts for critical comment before the researcher finalised her dissertation for 
submission. 
The researcher had previously conducted empirical research into broad energy planning 
before (Worthington & Martin, 2014; Martin & Fig, 2015) and with the permission of 
affected respondents, included four electricity-related interviews from previously 
documented interview minutes.  
A total of 26 semi-structured interviews were conducted (a copy of the typical interview 
outline is included as Annexure 1), of which 23 sufficiently comparable interviews were 
analysed to contribute to the empirical research findings presented here. In selecting these 23 
interviews, priority was given to those which provided a diversity of sector-specific 
perspectives on the IRP process e.g. civil society, business, labour, government (local and 
national) and academia as well as a reasonable balance of contributions from each of the two 
coalitions analysed. Annexure 2 provides a list of the respondents’ affiliations – organisations 
and coalitions, along with an indication of those respondents who participated in a critical 
review of initial findings.  
Please note that throughout the dissertation, respondent views are presented within the text, 
as follows: where unique points (only expressed by one or two respondents) are included, 
respondents are listed. In the case of 100% consensus among respondents, reference is made 
to ‘All respondents’. Where more than 12 of the 23 interviewed respondents supported a 
view, this was taken as ‘a majority’ or ‘most’ and specific respondents are not listed. Where 
between 8 and 12 respondents supported a view, this was taken as ‘many’, and specific 
respondents indicated. Views shared between 3 and 7 respondents were referred to as ‘a few’ 
or ‘some’, and specific respondents indicated. Respondents included 17 individuals from the 
two coalitions analysed, and six individuals not aligned with any of the two coalitions.  
The literature review began in September 2015. Some interviews were conducted in parallel 
with literature review and research analysis until the end of February 2016. Research findings 
were triangulated through desk analysis applying ACF guidelines between December 2015 
and early April 2016. As a final step to ensure the robustness of empirical findings, between 
April and May 2016, draft findings were shared with willing experts in small semi-structured 
workshops and their critical feedback contributed to updated findings before the researcher 
wrote up and finalised her dissertation for submission. 
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As noted above, electricity planning is a politically sensitive and often highly polarised and 
contested issue in South Africa. Most government stakeholders and members of coalitions 
expressed the preference to be interviewed anonymously. For the sake of consistency and 
simplicity, the identities of all participants have been protected, with interview notes 
authenticated by respondents and recordings entrusted to the researcher, in confidence. The 
researcher has provided her supervisor with proof of the authenticity of interviews.  
All stakeholders interviewed occupy senior, influential positions in South African electricity 
planning or SA energy policy and planning and/or advocacy itself. Ethics clearance for 
conducting interviews was applied for and approved by the University of Cape Town’s Ethics 
clearance committee early in September 2015. 
Scope of the research 
Aside from an initial consideration of relevant recent historical national electricity policy, 
related energy sector and political developments relevant to the IRP process, the research is 
mainly concerned with electricity planning-related political activities during the five year 
period between June 2010 and June 2015.  
Exclusions from the scope of the research 
While reference is made to the Integrated Energy Planning process (IEP), which has often 
overlapped with the IRP2010 process, and while acknowledging that electricity is a sub-
sector of energy, this research does not delve into the politics of broader energy planning. 
The research also does not analyse in any depth the economic or technical supply components 
of electricity system raised by coalitions. The findings only refer to economics and supply 
components as they relate directly to dominant lobbying and advocacy issues of the coalitions 
analysed e.g. the potential economic benefits, costs, assumptions and risks of nuclear power 
and renewable energies respectively.  
Aside from the five issues selected for analysis, there were a number of other advocacy issues 
raised by the coalitions reviewed which were ultimately not included in the research. A 
broader set of issues was considered, but the detailed analysis of policy engagement focused 
only on the most contested issues. Other issues raised by coalitions included how universal 
electricity access can be achieved through policy, the methodologies and assumptions 
underpinning the IRP2010 scenarios, and the transparency and inclusiveness of the process. 
The research has deliberately excluded assessment of the merits or shortcomings of expressed 
advocacy issues.  
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Outline of the dissertation  
Following the introduction, Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework and methodologies 
applied. With ACF to guide the analysis, Chapters 3 to 7 then seek to answer the four 
research questions. Based on the six key elements of ACF, answering the research questions 
required that the following main research tasks be undertaken: 
1. Identification of external factors affecting policy change: applying ACF to describe 
the basic attributes of the problem, basic distribution of energy-related resources, 
fundamental cultural values and social structure, basic legal structure pertaining to 
energy, definitions and scope (Chapters 1 and 2).  
2. Understanding the policy context: a succinct review of the politics of electricity 
planning including internal and external policy events, how political influence is 
exerted and the ACF-based conclusions that can be drawn along with a mapping of 
broad electricity sector advocacy issues (Chapter 3). 
3. Identification of two main coalitions and their advocacy issues: based on an overall 
mapping of dominant electricity sector policy advocacy, the memberships of two 
coalitions, identified in relation to their main advocacy issues and the issues most 
contested between them (Chapter 4). 
4. Analysis of the issues raised by the two coalitions and presentation of evidence for 
realisation of such issues in policy, during Policy event 1 – the IRP2010: systematic 
presentation of evidence gathered during interviews and comparison of relevant 
policy outcomes on advocated issues (Chapter 5). 
5. Analysis of the issues raised by the two coalitions and presentation of evidence for 
realisation of such issues in draft policy, during Policy event 2 – the IRP2013 update 
report: presentation of evidence gathered during interviews and narrative comparison 
of policy outcomes between IRP2010 and its update, along with a brief reflection on 
subsequent related events (Chapter 6).  
6. Written up conclusions and potential implications (Chapter 7). 
Chapters 3 to 6 will therefore collectively present the main empirical findings of the research, 
while Chapters 4 to 7 will most directly respond to the selected research questions.  
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Chapter 3: The politics of electricity planning in South Africa 
Broadly applied, politics is the practice and theory of how influence is exerted. More 
narrowly, the term refers to the activities of governments, members of institutions, and 
citizens (organised or individually) who try to influence the way a country is governed. A 
variety of methods of influence are commonly employed in politics. These include promoting 
or forcing narrow political views, engaging in strategic, long term negotiation and law 
making. It may even lead to the exertion of force through intimidation or outright warfare. 
Who influences, who is influenced, how influence is exerted, and the policy effects of such 
influence all make up the practice of politics (Chazan et al, 1992; Goodin, 2006).  
There are three distinct policy periods covered within this chapter. It commences with a brief 
preamble outlining the history and evolution of policy and politics within SA’s electricity 
sector up to 2000. Then, in keeping with the ACF requirement for a policy perspective of a 
decade or more to guide policy analysis of a policy event or events, analysis of the period 
between 2000 and 2010 is undertaken before the focus narrows further, to the period formally 
under review: June 2010 to June 2015. The last two periods are punctuated by analytical 
conclusions from an ACF perspective that can be drawn at selected milestones. 
Preamble 
Steyn (2001) and Marquard (2006) have provided detailed review and analysis of SA’s 
energy and electricity policy history and politics from the early 1900s onward. Marquard 
(2006) concluded that during the policy periods before 2000, policy crises had played a 
significant role in generating support for various energy policy initiatives and had ultimately 
significantly influenced the scope of the energy policy system and electricity subsystem 
policy domain. Some of these crises relate directly to the findings of this dissertation, and are 
worth noting briefly here as a preamble.  
Prior to democracy (officially, 1994), as the dominant electricity planning entity, Eskom’s 
approach had been dominated by a ‘security of supply’ objective, with accompanying low 
tariffs. This planning approach resulted in a significant overcapacity in the electricity 
generation sector which ultimately both supported and promoted electricity-intensive 
business up to the early 1990s (Marquard, 2006). Before the advent of democracy, providing 
everyone with access to electricity was not a policy priority. In the early 1990s, about one 
third of SA households were connected to the electricity grid (Winkler et al, 2011). The 
democratically elected ANC-led government set ambitious targets for universal electricity 
access and its target-driven National Electrification Programme (NEP) was an important part 
of this developmentally-oriented strategy. The NEP connected more than 3.4 million 
households within 7 years (Winkler et al, 2011). Between 1995 and 1998, at a time of wider 
‘structural adjustment’ economic policy, in an early policy partnership11 and led by 
government, the Energy Policy White Paper first introduced the idea of ‘market reform’ 
within the electricity sector. The need for power sector reform was argued on the basis of the 
importance of diversity of supply and the need for research and development of alternative 
and renewable energy resources and energy efficient technologies was advocated (DME, 
                                                 
11 Between the Minister for Public Works (Jeff Radebe), Minister of Finance (Trevor Manuel) and the Minister for Minerals 
and Energy (Penuel Meduna). 
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1998; Interviews).12 The EWP also stated that no further nuclear capacity would be required 
for a number of years. Key power sector reforms that were implemented as a result of the 
EWP were: the creation of the national energy regulator (NERSA), a two tier planning 
system that saw the national utility Eskom and NERSA responsible for electricity planning, 
and regulation of the nuclear sector (Nuclear Energy Act 46 of 1999; National Nuclear 
Regulator Act 47 of 1999). Significantly, the EWP predicted that electricity demand would 
exceed supply capacity by the year 2007.  
In 1999, six years after the Nuclear Energy Act had been published, a policy subsystem event 
relevant to this research took place: the pebble bed modular reactor (PBMR) programme was 
launched. Approval of the PBMR programme was championed by the deputy president 
(Thabo Mbeki), members of the Orthodox coalition actively advocated for it and in one of the 
earliest Reform coalition activities, members of the Reform coalition advocated against it 
(Interviews13). The PBMR was recalled by a majority of respondents as a pivotal policy ‘win’ 
for the Orthodox coalition, with the high level support of the deputy president adding 
political weight to their efforts, as well as a pivotal ‘loss’ for the Reform coalition 
(Interviews14). With this brief reflection on early democratic policy context, the focus now 
shifts to ACF analysis of policy events in the decade leading up to 2010.  
Based on the above preamble, ACF has been applied to consider policy evolution specific to 
the formal review period, with emphasis on events relevant to the two advocacy coalitions 
under review, and in order to interpret these events and activities in terms of the evolution of 
these advocacy coalitions. Given the challenge of simultaneously dealing with events, 
advocacy issues and the specific events signifying evolution of coalitions over time, a 
narrative approach is taken in order to arrive at a reasonably historically-informed point to 
guide analysis presented within Chapters 4 and 5.  
2000 onward 
In 2000 two important internal electricity subsystem events occurred: Eskom produced its 
first Integrated Strategic Electricity Plan (ISEP) and NERSA produced its National Integrated 
Resource Plan (NIRP). ISEP enjoyed technical credibility and NIRP enjoyed political 
legitimacy (Roux, 2012). An ‘external system event’15 also occurred that year: South Africa 
voluntarily submitted its first Initial National Communication under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
In 2001, in a move interpreted by some respondents16 as further government support for 
power sector reform, and what ACF would classify ‘a decision by government authorities’, 
Cabinet adopted a resolution that up to 30% of existing generating plant should be sold to the 
private sector. As it happens, this resolution remained a theoretical one that was not 
implemented. By 2004 it was re-interpreted by power sector reform actors to imply that 30% 
of ‘new’ generation capacity should be built by the private sector through independent power 
                                                 
12 These events recalled by a majority of respondents. 
13 Respondents 5, 8, 24 & 26 
14 View supported by a majority of respondents. 
15 ACF refers to policy events which occur in other policy subsystems, but with knock-on effects on the policy subsystem 
being considered, as ‘external’ system events. 
16 Respondents 8, 14, 17, 18 & 24 
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producers (IPPs). DME eventually initiated the procurement of only one 1 000 MW open 
cycle gas turbine (OCGT) peaking plant which underwent several years of policy adjustment 
until financial closure was reached in 2007 (Interviews17).  
Eskom was converted into a public company on 1 July 2002. The effects on the policy sub-
system of this change would continue to be felt for the next decade and more. Also in that 
month, a key external system event occurred: SA ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Although this 
latter agreement only entered into force early in 2005, the subsystem was theoretically 
required to start to take this into account in its planning. 
With the PBMR programme underway, the Energy Outlook for SA (EOSA, DME 2002), 
prepared for the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Johannesburg, 2002) promoted 
nuclear power as ‘the safest alternative for large-scale energy generation’. While recognising 
the high capital costs of this technology, the EOSA argued for the economic growth potential 
of nuclear power and excluded the practicality of RE technologies for base load application 
outright, stating that there were only four large-scale power options available for SA’s long 
term future: coal, nuclear, imported hydro and imported gas (DME, 2002). Interestingly, 
while the resulting WSSD Plan of Implementation included reference to the need for rural 
electrification and decentralised energy systems along with increased use of RE cleaner liquid 
and gaseous fuels and enhanced energy efficiency, it did not mention nuclear technology at 
all (DME, 2002). In what could be considered a ‘policy learning’ in ACF terms, it appears 
that government stance on renewable energy had been adjusted during the WSSD 
deliberations (Interviews18). In May 2001, a policy output – the White Paper on RE Policy – 
was gazetted. It included what was seen by all respondents as a major shift in SA’s RE 
policy, likely due to politics: a target of ‘10,000 GWh in final energy consumption by 2013’ 
(DME, 2003; Interviews19).  
In March 2003, the first Integrated Energy Plan had been published by DME. The IEP 
envisioned continued investigation into nuclear options, promoted energy efficiency demand 
side management (EEDSM) and diversification of energy supply through an increased share 
of natural gas and renewable energy (DME, 2003). At this point in time, South Africa’s 
electricity tariffs were among the lowest in the world and energy conservation and efficiency 
were not a common local priority (Baker et al., 2015). Nevertheless, in March 2005, 
government and industry agreed on a voluntary Energy Efficiency Accord to support 
achievement of the strategy (DME, 2005). There was little evidence of implementation of this 
accord for a few years (Interviews20). 
Analytical conclusions at this point in the history 
Applying the theoretical framework ACF, it can be concluded that up to about 2005, the 
policy system as a whole was characterised by a focus on policy development ‘for the 
rainbow nation’ especially policies aimed at overcoming socio-economic legacies of the 
apartheid era i.e. the major project of social transition which arguably continues to be under 
way. Tensions between differing political stances on the values and ideals of the anti-
                                                 
17 All points from interviews with respondents 8,14, 17, 18 & 24 
18 Respondents 12, 13, 17, 21 
19 All respondents agreed with this view. 
20 Respondents 8, 14, 15, 20 
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apartheid struggle and post-1994 democratic government, the delineation of political power 
domestically and abroad, and calls for an ‘African renaissance’ were starting to emerge 
within the broader policy system. In general, none of the key actors responsible for planning 
were paying attention to long term electricity supply investment during this period 
(Interviews21). Policy subsystem actors associated with the State were dominant in the sector 
e.g. DME, DPE, Finance, Labour, the Presidency and Eskom. Advocacy coalitions active 
within the energy and electricity sectors were thus mainly made up of government actors, the 
national utility and long-standing vested interests in energy-intensive industries. These actors 
were very selective in their attentions and beliefs-based advocacy on issues related to 
democratic transition and, given the country’s energy-intensive economy, it was easy for 
them to continue to protect vested interests in the status quo (Interviews22).  
The roots of some of advocacy issues such as a commitment to nuclear power investment, 
later advocated by the Orthodox coalition, were being reflected in policy stances. Power 
sector reform was being led by inter-ministerial partnership with support from the national 
utility and influential entities like the World Bank. As a whole, the power sector was being 
prepared to adjust to minor restructuring, in alignment with global power sector reforms 
already under way and as part of wider domestic economic reform. 
Civil society networks were not yet organising into visible, influential advocacy coalitions of 
belief, but members of the Reform coalition were starting to coalesce around issues e.g. 
opposition to PBMR and the expansion of nuclear power. Civil society was mainly focused 
on the transition to democracy and the many associated challenges and anti-nuclear lobbying 
and advocacy was commonly undertaken by small NGOs with limited strategic effort or 
impact (Interviews).23 ANC party policy in relation to nuclear power had begun to shift away 
from what it had been during the anti-apartheid struggle era (largely anti-nuclear) to clear 
policy stance shifts indicating that nuclear power was now ‘up for discussion’ as Respondent 
24 put it (Interviews).  
Within the broad policy system, macro socio-economic and political imperatives like the 
need for job creation, economic growth and global competitiveness, and government starting 
to participate in global and geo-politics, including climate negotiations were starting to 
directly influence the macro and micro policy priorities of government, with knock-on effects 
that would become increasingly visible within the electricity policy sub-system. 
2006 onward 
In early 2006, more or less in line with the 1998 EWP prediction, the first post-1994 load 
shedding and rolling blackouts occurred in some parts of SA. The cumulative effect was a 
significant growth in public awareness of the need to achieve energy security, the questioning 
of planning choices made and a greater insistence on a relatively new common belief: the 
value of accountability. The result was that within the electricity subsystem, the task of 
                                                 
21 Respondents 2, 3, 6, 15 
22 Respondents 3, 12, 21, 24 
23 Respondents 8, 12,13, 17, 24 
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planning had begun to shift from being a specialised, secluded concern of electricity and 
policy experts to being an issue of broad, contested public debate (Roux, 2012; Interviews24).  
In March 2006, the SA Cabinet commissioned a process to examine the potential for 
mitigation of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions through the Long-Term Mitigation 
Scenarios (LTMS). The LTMS aimed to provide a non-partisan scientific analysis for long 
term climate policy. It concluded that immediate action and extensive further work was 
required across the board: energy efficiency, cleaner coal, nuclear power, renewable energy 
and public transport along with related social behaviour change (LTMS, 2008). A majority of 
interviewed members of both coalitions expressed the belief that LTMS was perceived as 
politically unacceptable: those from the Orthodox coalition felt that LTMS was based on 
inflated carbon reduction targets, those from the Reform coalition felt that LTMS was 
insufficiently ambitious and was unlikely to influence policy implementation that would 
drive a transition away from coal (Interviews25; Researcher records).  
Also in 2006, what ACF refers to as a ‘relatively stable parameter’ changed: The Electricity 
Regulation Act was amended to require Eskom’s proposed tariff increases to be approved by 
NERSA through a multi-year price determination (MYPD) executed in 3-year cycles. From 
this point onward, and in a significant departure from previous practice, in order to justify 
tariff increases linked to new capacity, an IRP would have to have been submitted.  
In his February 2007 State of the Nation Address, delivered at a time when periodic two-hour 
long rolling national blackouts were worse than the power interruptions that had occurred in 
2006, President Mbeki reassured the public that targets for national water access, sanitation 
and electricity were ‘on track for achievement by 2012’ (Presidency, 2007). At the same 
time, members of the Orthodox coalition stepped up their advocacy in relation to the belief of 
what constituted secure base load power supply. This coalition started generating data on 
economic losses relating to power interruptions in support of their advocacy issue: increased 
investment in base load supply. Meanwhile, members of the Reform coalition stepped up 
their advocacy against nuclear power, with a focus on the issues relating to power sector 
reform through a greater share of renewables, and for behaviour change to drive carbon 
emissions reduction through energy efficiency and conservation. Climate change was 
increasingly entering the public discourse and policy decisions with potential knock-on 
effects in SA’s energy-intense economy were required, and were increasingly contested. The 
coalitions under review were now embarking on what would evolve into their most active 
period of contested belief-based advocacy (Interviews26; Researcher records).  
Kicking off what was also described by a majority of respondents from both coalitions as ‘a 
season of enhanced public engagement and transparency within the energy sector’, in 
September 2007, an inter-sectorial National Energy Summit was hosted in order to review the 
EWP (1998). A commitment to improve energy governance was included in the Summit’s 
declaration. Also in 2007, in another government policy-related partnership, DPE and 
National Treasury had commissioned a series of studies reviewing South Africa’s network 
infrastructure. A review of electricity examined the structure of supply, the efficiency of 
                                                 
24 A view expressed by a majority of respondents. 
25 Views expressed variously by a majority of respondents from both coalitions. 
26 Respondents from each of the coalitions all supported the view that their respective collective advocacy activities were 
stepped up from this point onward (2007). 
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distribution, identified areas of market dominance and monopoly abuse, and proposed 
regulatory safeguards. It echoed some of the points made by the EWP of 1998 and 
highlighted the urgent need for investment in capacity expansion, for such investment to be 
undertaken at the least cost, review of Eskom’s management, for generation-cost reflectivity 
to be implemented, and for transmission maintenance to be undertaken (Eberhard & 
Newberry, 2008). 
In December 2007, a significant broad policy event, the ANC’s 52nd Annual General 
Conference (AGC), took place in Polokwane. The conference elected Deputy President Jacob 
Zuma and his supporters to lead the party, although Mbeki was still the country’s President. It 
would be less than a year before Mbeki would be recalled by the party and Zuma appointed 
South Africa’s President. Members of both coalitions were asked to address the AGC and 
both hoped to influence the conference to support their views in favour of renewables (the 
Reform coalition) and nuclear (the Orthodox coalition). Both felt they had failed to prevail, 
given that attention had been focused on the party leadership battle under way (Interviews27; 
Researcher records). While the conference resolution recognised the need for action on 
climate change and also resolved to ‘ensure security of supply of energy resources and 
diversification of the energy mix’, it opted for the middle ground by including both 
renewable energy and nuclear power as supply options (ANC, 2007).  
In January 2008, the national grid was brought to near collapse with a widespread and 
persistent third round of regular national load shedding. Public and investor confidence in 
Eskom was severely shaken while government continued to largely be given the benefit of 
the doubt (Interviews28). Also in that month, DME released its Energy Security Master Plan 
(2007-2025), identifying the gaps in supply and presented an Integrated Resource Plan 
(NIRP3) with Eskom being tasked with the responsibility to develop actual projects to meet 
demand. This plan was never again mentioned in DME annual reports, although it was 
recalled by some interview respondents (Interviews29). In a significant policy subsystem 
event, DME was split into two separate departments: Energy and Mineral Resources in a 
process that began in 2008 and concluded in 2009. This contributed to policy development 
delay and interrupted emerging public engagement process for integrated energy policy 
development (Fischer & Martin, 2012; Interviews30).  
Resuming the trend of improved public engagement, a National Stakeholder Summit on 
Electricity was initiated by the ANC and convened in May 2008. Significantly, the 
declaration of this Summit recognised the need for a significant (more cost-reflective) 
electricity tariff increase in order to restore the financial health of Eskom and the necessary 
investment in electricity generation and transmission infrastructure (Interviews31).  
Also in 2008, in order to ‘facilitate co-operative governance’ on climate change, an 
Intergovernmental Committee on Climate Change (IGCC) was established (GCIS, 2016). The 
IGCC continues to serve as the President’s ‘delivery forum’ for climate change outputs but 
no evidence of this body exerting any political influence was found in this research.   
                                                 
27 Respondents 2, 3, 5, 18, 19, 24 
28 A majority respondent view. 
29 Respondents 8, 12, 14, 24 
30 Respondents 7 – 9, 14, 15, 23 
31 Respondents 7-9, 14, 15, 23 
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The National Energy Act of November 2008 included the requirement to ensure that diverse 
energy resources were available, in sustainable quantities and at affordable prices. It also 
located the responsibility for planning with the Minister of Energy and committed the 
Minister to developing and annually reviewing and publishing an IEP that had been subjected 
to considered public comments.  
Analytical conclusions  
This period was characterised by stronger inter-departmental partnerships, by rapidly 
increasing public interest in electricity policy, and improved transparency in governance. A 
dynamic external factor had started to exert some influence on domestic policy: climate 
change and, given SA’s emission-intensive energy generation setup, the need to take action 
on mitigation. An external system shock – the global financial meltdown of 2008 – did not 
have immediate effects on South Africa, but economists understood that these effects would 
be felt before long. Government demonstrated policy learning by adjusting to external 
pressure to recognise the role of RE. Energy efficiency was starting to appear to be an 
important topic, with detailed policy and targets to drive its achievement in practice, even 
though this was seen by most sub-system actors as lip service. The knock-on effects of 
energy planning and climate policy were starting to become public knowledge, and the need 
to diversify the energy mix and reform the power sector was gaining public interest.  
Load shedding and rolling blackouts led to significant growth in public awareness of the 
value of electricity planning, which motivated a new season of government-led policy reform. 
This area of planning moved from being a specialised, secluded concern of electricity and 
policy experts to being an issue of broad public debate and engagement. Electricity planning 
had started to become a politically charged issue in SA’s democracy.  
Broad policy advocacy coalitions were starting to emerge and broader civil society 
engagement with electricity policy had started to grow. Some clear advocacy coalitions had 
started to emerge: those focused on job creation and economic growth – regardless of supply 
resource; those focused on environmental justice – regardless of economic growth; those 
focused on good governance – regardless of economic and energy planning; an those 
interested in the role of base load, the opportunities presented by nuclear power 
commercialisation, and the competitive advantage of domestic industry. Coalitions were 
being formed all over the country, with the dominant (most vocal, most actively visible) ones 
emerging in the main economic hubs: Johannesburg, Cape Town and KwaZulu-Natal. The 
state had begun to echo the advocacy beliefs expressed by the Orthodox coalition in relation 
to ‘energy security’.  
2009 to mid-2010 
Early in 2009, in order to meet the MYPD tariff increase requirements, Eskom hastily 
repackaged the ISEP as the IRP1. This was rejected by government, and a ministerial 
determination was issued in the absence of a proper IRP.32 Nevertheless, this heralded the 
start of the IRP2 process which was later renamed IRP2010.  
                                                 
32 IRP1 included policy objectives for 10 000 GWh RE (approximately 4% of the energy mix) by 2013, the implementation 
of energy efficiency and demand side management through a standard offer financial incentive scheme, and installation of 
one million solar water heaters. 
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Continuing the government narrative in support of power sector reform, Minister of Energy 
Dipuo Peters included reference to an “ISO” (independent system operator) in her 2009 
budget speech (DoE, 2009). During the year, three significant policy subsystem events took 
place: 1) new Generation Regulations were issued, including new discretionary powers for 
the new Minister of Energy and new planning mechanisms by which new generation capacity 
would be estimated; 2) a National Climate Policy Development Summit was held; and 3) 
NERSA published Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff (REFIT) guidelines.  
The “new Gen Regs” as they came to be referred to, aimed to clarify the roles of Eskom, the 
Minister of Energy, the Minister of Finance and NERSA. It also formally unified the NIRP 
and ISEP processes under the auspices of the DoE and included REFIT regulations. Eskom’s 
System Operation and Planning (SO&P) department was now tasked with the responsibility 
of developing the IRP in collaboration with the DoE and NERSA. Most significantly, the 
Minister of Energy would have the final say over the IRP and in concurrence with the 
Minister of Finance, ‘the final say over public/private allocation of generation opportunities’ 
(Pickering, 2010). From this point forward, in the absence of up to date policy, the new Gen 
Regs have effectively governed electricity planning, except for nuclear power related matters 
which continued to be governed by Executive power (Interviews33). A Cabinet statement on 6 
September 2009 designated Eskom as ‘single buyer of power from Independent power 
producers’ provided yet another indication of government policy shift toward power sector 
reform, but interpretation of whether ‘single buyer’ referred to the national utility or some 
other entity like an independent market operator was left open to wide interpretation 
(Pickering, 2010). The National Climate Summit (as it became known) resulted in a number 
of climate-related commitments informed by the LTMS and ultimately resulted in the 
drafting of the National Climate Change Response White Paper of October 2011.  
Since about 2007, but perhaps far more visibly since 2009 when SA hosted the 17th United 
Nations Conference of the Parties, public awareness of the need to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions had grown remarkably (Interviews34). This awareness had exceeded public policy 
that could incentivise low-carbon lifestyle choices, particularly energy-related choices given 
SA’s massive dependence on coal for energy supply, that were in keeping with stated 
government ambition. In May 2009, the Greenhouse Gas Inventory SA (1990-2000) had been 
presented at the UN climate meeting. At the time, four-fifths of the country’s emissions were 
associated with energy supply (transport, industrial, commercial and residential). This placed 
South Africa 19th on the global ranking of GHG emissions in 2000. A distinct vision 
disconnect, possibly even a contradiction between SA’s energy and climate policies was 
increasingly highlighted by the Reform coalition in its advocacy (Interviews35) and later 
confirmed by a policy analysis produced by Trollip and Tyler for the National Planning 
commission, in 2011.  
In September 2009 a Green Paper on National Strategic Planning was published by the 
Presidency. The paper proposed a National Planning Commission (NPC) which was 
inaugurated in May 2010 with the mandate of taking a broad, cross-cutting, independent and 
critical view of South Africa, to help define the SA to be achieved by 2030 and to map out a 
                                                 
33 Views held by a majority of respondents. 
34 Respondents 7, 11-13, 23 
35 Respondents 11-13, 21-24 
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path toward achieving these objectives (Presidency, 2009). Throughout 2009 DoE, Eskom 
and NERSA had been developing the first version of the IRP and they produced a 
preliminary report in September 2009 (Researcher records; Interviews36). This document is 
no longer available in the public domain.  
In February 2010, the DPE minister, Barbara Hogan announced government’s intention to 
reduce support for the PBMR programme and cut 75% of programme staff (DPE, 2010). Also 
in February 2010, an IRP Technical Task Team (TTT)37 was officially established by DoE, 
but this information was only made publicly known after the first public consultations began 
– in response to a written request for clarity from members of the Reform coalition 
(Interviews). The TTT’s objectives were: to produce ‘a technically competent and credible’ 
IRP and ‘develop a stakeholder engagement strategy and plan for its implementation’ (DoE, 
2010c). Respondents from the Reform coalition claim that the TTT was initiated ‘secretly’ 
and sustained by energy-intensive users who were mainly pursuing fossil-fuel friendly policy 
certainty (Interviews). The TTT was made up mainly of members aligned with advocacy 
beliefs of the Orthodox coalition. Meetings of the TTT were closed to the public and requests 
to the DoE for copies of its minutes were refused. From this point onward members of the 
Reform coalition regularly highlighted the ‘bias of the secret committee of experts advising 
the DoE’ on electricity planning (media reports; IRP2010 submissions; Interviews38). 
Some months later, in May 2010, the IRP2010 process was opened up to public consultation 
via invited written comments no later than June 2010 on the first Draft IRP2010 input 
parameter sheets.39  
Following on the heels of a series of system failures i.e. inadequate generation planning, 
failure to implement proposed sector reforms to admit IPPs and delayed decisions on 
Eskom’s new build programme all of which had led to a dangerous decline in system reserve 
margin and growing electricity supply insecurity, President Zuma in his June 2010 State of 
the Nation Address formally committed government to establishing an independent system 
operator. Later the word ‘market’ was inserted and the acronym ISMO – independent system 
market operator – became commonly used. ISMO would ‘look at the participation of 
independent power producers and protecting the poor from rising electricity prices’, 
effectively a formal move toward power sector reform (Presidency, 2010). Significantly, it 
was proposed that generation capacity planning could be included as a function of ISMO. All 
respondents recalled a largely positive response to the establishment of ISMO, with the 
exception of two respondents from the Orthodox coalition who recalled the cautionary note 
from the National Union of Mineworkers and the view expressed by the SA National Energy 
Agency that ‘there was no need for a new institution within the sector’ (Interviews40). 
 
                                                 
36 Respondents 3, 6, 14, 19, 24 
37 Members of the TTT: 4 DoE officials including the Director General Nelisiwe Magubane, 2 Eskom system operations and 
planning, 6 energy intensive users, 1 local government-owned power company, 1 IPP association, 1 academic, 1 
consultancy. 
38 Respondents 21-24. 
39 Public comment initially opened for a 30-day period, later extended to 60 days on request from both coalitions 
(respondents 21-24) 
40 Respondents 8 and 14. 
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Analytical conclusions  
Public awareness and related advocacy beliefs across a range of policy themes was growing: 
the strategic importance of electricity planning, climate change and the need to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, the effects of investment on electricity tariffs, the need for 
consultative and transparent national planning, and nuclear risk. Public engagement with 
policy was also maturing, with electricity supply shortfalls being a major driver of interest, as 
well as linkages being made with external events like climate change and the local effects of 
the global financial crisis.  
The function of Planning was taking a more prominent position on the policy landscape. The 
two Coalitions under review were both taking clearer shape, with clearly expressed common 
beliefs and with stronger national and growing international alliances. The maturity of 
governance in general was starting to emerge. Figure 2 presents an overview of the broad, 
high-level advocacy issues for the electricity sector as a whole in 2010 and 2011, providing a 
perspective on the context and the range of political pressure points. No ‘policy brokers’ were 
identified during interviews covering the history up to this point. 
In Chapter 4, issues associated specifically with the two advocacy coalitions under review are 
introduced as a prelude to identifying the five most contested issues. These five contested 
issues then become the focus of the dissertation.    
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Figure 2: Main advocacy issues within SA’s broad electricity sector in 2010/11 
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Chapter 4: Analysing members of the Coalitions and their key 
issues 
Chapter 3 provided necessary historical policy context in order to start to introduce key 
actors, policy events and the main advocacy issues within the sector by 2011. This chapter 
now answers research questions 1 and 2.  
In keeping with the ACF methodology, coalitions were identified on the basis of the common 
beliefs they aligned themselves with or coalesced around, and whether they co-operated with 
one another, formally or informally on issues. Interview respondents were then identified (as 
described in Chapter 2), representing members of the two coalitions as well as other 
influential actors within the sub-system. The list of respondents is included as Annexure 2.  
Initial lists of coalition members were shared with interview respondents and then updated 
based on respondent feedback and with new insights gained as the research progressed. The 
research also revealed a list of government actors that regularly echoed the expressed beliefs 
of each of the coalitions. Rather than include government actors within coalitions, these have 
been kept separate, in order to emphasise dynamics of political power, influence and support.   
There are many advocacy issues raised by stakeholders in South Africa’s electricity sector. 
The research has confirmed that, as in other cases analysed in South Africa’s electricity 
sector, advocacy coalitions are not static or linear and advocacy strategies are often difficult 
for non-members to understand. While on occasion ‘advocacy issues’ are quite distinctly 
associated with specific coalitions, whether seen from internal or external perspective, 
sometimes aspects of very different coalition beliefs include unexpected points of overlap. 
On occasion, coalitions that hold fundamentally differing positions on ‘issues’ will agree in 
their critical assessments of policy assumptions and process e.g. demand and GDP growth 
assumptions, perceptions of unfair exertion of influence on government decision-making 
process, and a lack of consistency in policy. At times, policy learning for a coalition will 
include understanding the effectiveness of applying strategies like ‘smoke and mirrors’ so 
that coalitions will appear to advocate for a position while in fact intending to achieve an 
opposite policy outcome. Finally, there are many actors and networks that do not self-identify 
formally with specific coalitions, yet express beliefs that clearly align with those of specific 
coalitions. These include government actors. In such cases, non-coalition actors can have 
greater powers of influence on policy that are often only evident in the policy choices 
ultimately made. 
While acknowledging the complexity of coalitions and how they are formed and sustained 
over time, two high-level advocacy coalitions were identified by the research, and their ‘face 
value’ activities reviewed. This was achieved on the basis of expressed coalition issues in 
IRP2010 submissions, media reports and views provided by respondents. Readers are asked 
to bear in mind that the specific advocacy coalition findings in relation to the IRP2010 
process presented here apply to the period June 2010 to June 2011, and for the update, to the 
period December 2013 to June 2015. It is acknowledged that many contextual and coalition 
shifts happened during and after these periods. It is further emphasised that the policy process 
applied for the IRP2010 and the IRP2013 differed substantially. 
The two most prominent advocacy coalitions and their core beliefs are described below.  
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Coalition 1, labelled the “Orthodox coalition”: Centralised base load provides secure 
supply which can in turn drive economic growth that is ultimately good for everyone. Secure 
supply can be provided mainly via centralised coal and nuclear power, both of which are 
derived from economically-justifiable mineral resource exploitation. 
One of this coalition’s core beliefs was described by Respondent 8 as follows: 
‘Nuclear energy enables attainment of South Africa’s climate change 
mitigation ambitions’ and ‘nuclear energy is a proven technology which can 
further enhance the reliability of base load electricity supply in support of 
Government’s economic and social goals’.  
Coalition 2, labelled the “Reform coalition”: Power sector reform can directly enable 
sustainable growth and ensure long term common well-being. Such supply can be achieved 
mainly via a mix of centralised and distributed renewable power supply derived from 
sustainable resource application.  
One of this coalition’s core beliefs was expressed by Respondent 11 as: 
‘It is important that we make decisions today that can steer us towards a 
steady, just transition away from fossil fuels and nuclear supply toward 
renewable energy. A system-wide switch to renewables will create jobs and 
will be less financially and environmentally risky for all, especially future 
generations.’ 
Members of the two coalitions 
The members making up the two coalitions under review are included in Figure 3.
The politics of electricity planning in South Africa – Brenda Martin 
26 
Figure 3: Members of the two coalitions under review 
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The research also confirmed the following government actors that shared some expressed 
beliefs with the Orthodox coalition during the IRP2010 process (Interviews41): 
• The President 
• The National Nuclear Executive Coordinating Committee (NNECC) (renamed ‘the 
Energy Security Sub-Committee’ (ESSC) in 2013, chaired by the President) 
• The Department of Energy 
• The National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) 
• The Department of Public Enterprises 
• The Department of Trade and Industry 
The following government actors shared expressed beliefs with the Reform coalition during 
the IRP2010 process (Interviews42): 
• The National Planning Commission 
• The Department of Environmental Affairs 
• National Treasury, on the topic of carbon tax. 
General advocacy issues of the two coalitions 
The researcher studied all presentations available on the DoE website between June 2015 and 
January 2016. After triangulating these and other submissions not posted on the website with 
grey literature and the recollections of interview respondents, she summarised and listed the 
main advocacy issues raised by the two coalitions. These summarised lists were then 
subjected to critical review by interview respondents and two independent industry experts. 
General advocacy issues for the two coalitions were grouped under 5 selected, contested 
issue-based themes which were also subjected to critical review. The sector and coalition-
related maps provided here thus represent reviewed summaries of expressed coalition beliefs 
and are not to be read ‘verbatim’. Figure 3 summarises the broad issues for which the two 
coalitions were found to have advocated. Upon further analysis, particularly after interviews 
were completed, the research revealed that five issues emerged as the most contested by both 
coalitions.  From this point onward in the dissertation, reflecting key research findings, these 
five issues are the focus of analysis.   
The five most contested advocacy issues 
Research questions 1 and 2 have now been answered. As can be seen from Figure 4 below, a 
wide range of advocacy issues were raised by the two coalitions. However, the research 
revealed, by majority view that the five most contested IRP2010 advocacy issues between the 
two coalitions were:  
1. Tariffs, and investment, affordability 
2. Power sector reform 
3. Climate change 
4. Nuclear power  
5. Renewable energy 
                                                 
41 A majority of respondents from both coalitions expressed this view. 
42 A majority of respondents from both coalitions expressed this view. 
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Figure 4: Broad advocacy beliefs of the two Coalitions under review 
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Chapter 5: Applying ACF to understand coalitions’ influence on 
the IRP2010 process  
In Chapter 4, the two dominant advocacy coalitions seeking to influence planning, along with 
their advocacy issues have been introduced along with the emerging five most contested and 
thus dominant issues. In starting to answer the third research question: “What evidence could 
be found for how the issues of dominant advocacy coalitions were realised in electricity 
policy?” this chapter applies ACF to understand events, expressed beliefs and advocated 
issues for the period between mid-2010 and April 2011, when the IRP2010 was promulgated. 
The chapter concludes with analysis of findings, in order to assess policy realisation. The 
next chapter will add the final set of findings in response to research question 3.  
First, integrated resource planning practice is briefly considered in general terms, before 
shifting to policy-relevant events leading up to South Africa’s electricity planning process 
between October 2010 and December 2011. The chapter concludes with an assessment of 
policy in order to gauge how influential each of the coalitions had been in their advocacy 
efforts.  
Electricity planning, also known as integrated resource planning (IRP)  
Unlike other planning approaches which only take into account direct costs incurred by the 
utility and the consumer, the IRP approach (also known as least cost planning or LCP) has 
four key distinguishing characteristics (Hirst & Goldman, 1991): 
1. Explicit consideration of energy efficiency and load management programmes as least 
cost alternatives to some new build. 
2. Consideration of both environmental factors and direct economic costs. 
3. Public participation and consultation. 
4. Analysis of the uncertainties and risks posed by different resource portfolios and by 
external factors. 
Power planning generally is essentially concerned with the comparison of alternative 
electricity futures with the support of mathematical computer models. The issue of 
uncertainty is dominant, hence scenario analysis based on various input parameters has 
emerged as common practice to balance divergent views about the future. A range of 
scenarios are constructed according to different (often conflicting) goals, and then tested by 
sensitivity analysis43 so that a most plausible scenario may be selected which can result in a 
plan. This process is not wholly dependent on input data and modelling (Roxburgh, 2009). As 
the South African experience has demonstrated, public participation toward consensus 
building can be an important factor contributing to broad acceptance of a promulgated plan.   
The process of identifying and then engaging with demand assumptions and related supply 
mix findings, selecting which scenarios to consider seriously and which to ignore, should 
ideally be subject to discussion and negotiation among a variety of individuals with diverse 
views. Given that subjectivity is understood to be present at all stages of the process from 
                                                 
43 Sensitivity analysis is a statistical tool used to test the robustness of the plan. 
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modelling to public engagement and Cabinet approval, transparency is an essential part of the 
process (Borchers, 2000).  
Seeking to balance a review of government-led process and the actions of the two selected 
coalitions over time, what follows considers two periods in the development of IRP2010 
periods: May to October 2010, and November to December 2010. The reader’s attention is 
drawn particularly to the points made by the DoE in relation to the priority placed on ‘cost 
effectiveness’, the basis of consultative, knowledge (as opposed to interest)-driven decision-
making, the commitment to mitigating uncertainty by implementing an IRP review process, 
and the continued commitment to transparent public engagement process. These points will 
be revisited later on in the dissertation. 
The IRP2010 and related policy events between May and October 2010  
In May 2010, the IRP2010 process was opened up to public comments within 30 days on the 
input parameter sheets of the first Draft IRP2010, which proposed a revised balanced 
scenario (RBS)44. From this point forward until about December 2010, the IRP’s public 
consultation process was experienced by a majority of respondents as ‘unprecedented in its 
transparency and consultative approach’. The official credited most widely for promoting this 
approach is Kannan Lakmeeharan (of Eskom system operations and planning) (Interviews45). 
However, some members of the reform coalition released quantitative analysis of how DoE 
responded to their comments on the draft IRP’s input parameters, finding that there was no 
response to 61% of their comments (EGI-SA, October 2010). Also, where the DoE did 
respond to comments, the standard response was: ‘apply subjective expert judgement’. The 
latter part of 2010 is thus recalled, by all  Reform coalition respondents and a minority of 
Orthodox coalition members as a time when the open public engagement process which had 
briefly characterised the IRP process up to that point began to close (Interviews46).  
The draft IRP and its proposed revised balanced scenario had been based on the selection of 
‘a cost-optimal solution for new build options’ which were then ‘balanced’ with qualitative 
measures such as job creation (DoE, 2011). RBS included allocations for: ‘a nuclear fleet’ of 
9.6GW, 6.3GW coal, 11.4GW renewables and 11GW of other generation sources (DoE, 
2010a). 
In July 2010, with approximately R10 billion spent, and with a further R30 billion required to 
achieve commercialisation, government formally announced its decision to ‘mothball’ the 
PBMR programme (DPE, 2010a). The anti-nuclear movement claimed a policy victory and a 
specific policy lesson was identified by Reform coalition respondents as follows: ‘pressuring 
government via the parliamentary portfolio committee works!’ A member of the Orthodox 
coalition (Respondent 8) recalled this event as follows: ‘government had to admit that the 
initial goal: commercial viability, was not going to be achieved and thus was forced to close 
down the programme – it was an economic decision, not a technical one, nothing to do with 
anti-nuclear lobbying’. 
In parallel with the IRP process, in September 2010, the Medium Term Risk Mitigation Plan 
‘to keep the lights on’ had been published. The plan specifically dealt with the anticipated 
                                                 
44 This period later extended to 60 days on request from both coalitions (confirmed by a majority of respondents) 
45 A majority of respondents supported this view.  
46 All Reform coalition respondents and Orthodox coalition respondents 8, 14 and 15 
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electricity supply shortfall between 2011 and 2016 and included non-Eskom electricity 
generation initiatives (like own-generation of major industries) and EEDSM programmes 
(like the National Solar Water Heater Rollout programme) as well as a 963MW power buy-
back programme from the Energy Intensive Users’ Group. Respondents recalled these sub-
system events as influential in the sense that ‘keeping the lights on’ would become a growing 
narrative of government, applied ‘opportunistically’ to justify continued investment in large 
power supply and/or deflect attention from the long-term low tariffs offered to energy 
intensive users (Interviews47).  
Given South Africa’s significant energy carbon footprint, it is worth noting here as an 
external system event, the National Climate Change Response White Paper (NCCR) with 
emission reduction targets aligned with the LTMS was published in October 2011, just in 
time for the 17th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP17) which 
was hosted by South Africa. Climate mitigation objectives and adaptation goals all had 
significant likely implications for energy policy. Many respondents expressed the view that in 
practice, initial policy effects were not taken seriously. In addition, these same respondents 
speculated that both the NCCR and the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers 
Procurement Process (REIPPPP) would have been unlikely to benefit from such policy 
support had it not been for COP17 (Interviews48). Once again it seemed, the imperatives of 
politics had directly influenced policy events. 
Analytical conclusions at this point 
The broad advocacy issues for electricity planning in 2010/11 that were noted during the 
research have been presented in Figure 4 above. By 2010, public engagement with policy 
process had grown significantly and included remarkable interest in issues like electricity 
planning, climate change policy, electricity tariffs, national planning, and nuclear risk and/or 
opportunity. Within the electricity policy subsector, public engagement activities had started 
to become strategically driven, focused and resourceful. Clear coalitions were now dominant 
and active within the SA energy policy sector, and many of these had links with international 
alliances. Coalitions were based on unifying beliefs related to public health and well-being, 
rights of the earth, economic growth linked directly to electricity growth, the state’s 
prerogative on long term public investment, public engagement process, air quality, the 
country’s national emissions, and questions of centralised and decentralised power supply. 
On the whole, by October 2010, the exercise of political influence, the effects of divergent 
power dynamics, the different advocacy strategies that had been applied, consistent lobbying 
points and visible actors were emerging from all sectors. Active lobbying coalitions in SA’s 
electricity policy sub-sector were more visible than ever before.  
November to December 2010: toward the promulgated IRP 
The process of finalising the IRP from RBS to promulgation is now considered in the light of 
the five most contested advocacy issues selected for analysis.  
                                                 
47 Respondents 21-24 
48 Respondents 2, 6, 8, 11, 13, 17, 20, 23. 
   
The politics of electricity planning in South Africa – Brenda Martin 
32 
Following written comments on the first draft report, DoE released a second draft Integrated 
Electricity Resource Plan for SA (IRP2010) in October 2010. This draft recommended the 
Revised Balanced Scenario to the Cabinet for approval before the process was opened up 
again for public comments in writing and in public hearings in Cape Town, KwaZulu-Natal 
and Gauteng during November and early December 2010. Many written submissions had 
been received on RBS and the opportunities to do presentations at public hearings were taken 
up by a large number of individuals and organised groups, including members of the two 
coalitions under review. In retrospect, this was a moment of unprecedented transparency and 
civil society consultation in South Africa’s power generation planning (Pickering, 2010).  
Key DoE and Eskom actors involved in the process were: Nelisiwe Magubane, DoE Director-
General, Ompi Aphane, one of the DoE Deputy Directors-General and Kanan Lakmeeharan, 
Eskom Divisional Executive: System Operations & Planning, Eskom (Nov 2008 to Jan 
2011). A majority of interview respondents from both coalitions pointed to the influential role 
played by Lakmeeharan to ensure that the IRP2010 policy process was both transparent and 
consultative. He was recognised as one of the only ‘policy brokers’ who earned and sustained 
trust across coalitions, in respondent interviews (Interviews49).   
The DoE opened each hearing with the same introductory presentation and emphasised its 
impartiality and interest in decision-making based on knowledge and consultation: 
“This IRP consultation process is designed to allow the DoE to arrive at a plan for the 
country which is based on knowledge, data, reason and consultation – and not on ideological 
convenience or the needs of a narrow constituency!” It further emphasised that the IRP2010 
was ‘not a short or medium-term operational plan but a plan that directs the expansion of the 
electricity supply over the 20 year period’ (DoE, 2010a).  
The department also shared the following information regarding its proposed generation mix: 
• That RE generation involves ‘massive land requirements’; 
• That the ‘footprint of nuclear power is much smaller than that of solar and wind’;  
• That ‘a 1 000MW nuclear plant requires less than two square kilometres of land. 
Comparable solar and wind plants require respectively, 130 and 500 square kilometres 
of land’; 
• That the ‘international order book for nuclear is long’ – for the next 20 years ‘there is 
an order book for over 600 reactors globally’; 
• There are lessons to be learned for implementation scales from the Spanish example; 
and 
• The ‘risk adjusted scenario needs to have a production study to determine its 
suitability and impact’ (DoE, 2010a). 
As most Reform coalition respondents saw it, government’s bias toward nuclear power and 
against renewables was evident from the start of the public hearings (Interviews50). 
 
 
                                                 
49 This view confirmed by a majority of respondents interviewed. 
50 Respondents 7, 11, 13, 21, 23 and 24. 
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Summary of submissions 
Submissions were received from the following groupings (DoE, 2010a):51 
NGOs & civil society:  67 
Academics and consultants:  63 
Industry and business:  70 
 
The researcher has studied presentations available on the DoE website at the time of writing 
(March/April 2016). After triangulating these with grey literature (listed at the end of 
references) and the recollections of interview respondents, she summarised the main common 
advocacy issues raised by the two coalitions in response to the IRP2010 draft below. These 
summaries have also benefited from critical review by willing interview respondents later in 
the writing process.  
While a far larger number of civil society submissions could be expected in the context of 
growing public awareness and mobilisation, it is worth noting that participation in public 
policy formulation requires time, resources and capacity - the time to read through 
documents, the capacity to understand technical detail, resources such as access to the 
internet, knowledgeable advisers, funds to travel to public hearings, as well as the loss of 
income-earning time spent in public hearings. For these reasons, parties with the best access 
to capacity and resources tend to be best able to influence public participation processes. It 
was therefore unsurprising that participation in the IRP2010 was dominated by well-
resourced groups and individuals.  
While many submissions commended the DoE for its transparency on technical matters, 
concerns were raised in relation to process: tight timeframes for submissions, the practical 
constraints on engagement of rural and poor communities, the lack of capacity building to 
enable broad engagement on technical issues, uncertainty in relation to whether (or to what 
extent) decisions had already been made by government and the IRP process would merely 
provide a ‘rubber stamp’, and the fact that the IRP process should not be completed before, or 
in isolation of the Integrated Energy Plan (summary of IRP2010 submissions).  
At the hearings the DoE noted that ‘most respondents called for a low-carbon economy and 
for a thrust to be on renewable energy (wind, solar, geothermal etc.) in future, to a maximum 
of 75% of total energy supplied by 2050’. It also noted that ‘many’ were opposed to nuclear 
and coal as future energy solutions, pointing particularly to the costs and financing 
difficulties of both. The DoE found cost references within renewable energy supply options 
to be contradictory (wind and concentrated solar power – CSP – in particular). In the DoE’s 
view, there had been ‘general confusion and lack of discrimination’ between concepts e.g. 
inputs, outcomes, policy, regulating instruments such as tariffs, constraints and remedies to 
unblock such constraints. Finally, there had been many calls for water and infrastructure 
impacts to be considered when making generation technology choices.  
                                                 
51 These numbers do not add up to 81 submissions. When asked to clarify, DoE said that it would ‘revert after consultation’. 
This did not take place as promised (respondents 22-24). 
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The DoE listed the number of comments received for each input parameter (see below) and 
indicated that all received comments had been incorporated into the further analysis for each 
parameter. The five issues highlighted in this dissertation as having been contested by both 
coalitions were well represented on this list. 
 
IRP parameter Total 
Renewable generation 200 
The IRP2010 consultation process 111 
Demand response 94 
Economic factors 92 
Climate change 78 
Non-Eskom generation 68 
Security of supply 52 
Demand forecast 32 
Price elasticity [of demand] 29 
Cost of generation options 28 
Non IRP-related 25 
Water 22 
DOE, 2010a 
The most critical dimensions of the IRP noted by the DoE, which also reflected many of the 
five most contested issues of the two coalitions under review, were as follows:  
• Electricity prices/ tariffs; 
• Carbon and emissions; 
• Regional development; 
• Generation mix; and 
• Implementation timeframes and costs. 
Based on this, the DoE had concluded that SA faces ‘a period of tough choices, primarily 
between economic growth and economic stagnation’ and expressed a view also held by the 
Orthodox coalition that ‘no economy can grow in an energy-constrained environment’ (DoE, 
2010a). Government’s priority was clearly stated as follows: ‘The IRP has to provide insight 
into how South Africa can deliver the requisite energy to fuel growth in the economy AND do 
so in a manner which is affordable and ensures South Africa remains internationally 
competitive’. Finally, the department had understood that ‘the public relished the 
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participation process and its continued use in long-term planning must be ensured’ (DoE, 
2010a; Researcher records; Confirmed in a majority of interviews).  
It is worth noting here a few parallel policy events unfolding within the electricity policy sub-
system at the same point in time. REFIT regulations were repealed in November 2010 and 
finally replaced with a competitive bidding process (REBID). REBID was subsequently 
replaced with the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers’ Procurement Process in 
May 2011. When it was launched, REIPPPP would be managed by National Treasury’s 
Public-Private Partnership Unit in partnership with the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
and DoE. At the same time, government adopted the New Growth Path (NGP) as ‘the 
framework for economic policy and the driver of the country’s jobs strategy’ and referred 
specifically to ‘a dynamic vision for how we can collectively achieve a more developed, 
democratic, cohesive and equitable economy and society over the medium term, in the 
context of sustained growth’ (Economic Development Ministry, 2010). Members of the 
Reform coalition pointed out in their IRP2010 submissions that the NGP suggested a likely 
economic growth shift away from energy-intensive smelters to more inclusive, job-creating 
and low-carbon job creation (EGI-SA, SAFCEI, Earthlife Africa Johannesburg; Interviews.52)  
Analysis of the advocacy issues raised by the two coalitions in response to the 
draft IRP 
The findings and analysis thereof now start to focus on the five most contested advocacy 
issues presented within the IRP2010 process by the two coalitions: tariffs, investment 
affordability, costs; climate change; power sector reform; nuclear power; renewable energy. 
The ‘headline’ or main advocacy positions of each of the reviewed coalitions are briefly 
discussed, with greater detail provided in Figures 5 to 9.   
DoE’s response to submissions, along with analysis of the extent to which advocacy beliefs 
were reflected in promulgated policy will then be presented in narrative form, before Chapter 
6 looks at the 2013 update report and subsequent events.  
It is important to note that not all advocacy issues could be divided absolutely across 
coalitions. There were both many overlapping points of view and some divergence of views 
expressed among the many members of the two coalitions. In analysing formal records of 
presentations, grey literature and interview responses, the researcher has sought to take 
subtleties into account carefully in the summaries presented below. These summaries were 
shared in draft form, with interview respondents and thus benefited from respondent 
feedback. 
1. Tariffs, investment affordability, costs 
Both coalitions expressed the need to protect the poor from rising tariffs. On the one 
hand, the Reform coalition pointed out tariff effects linked to investment plans based 
on inflated demand, global shifts away from carbon-intensive power, and investment 
choices that would invariably lead to raised tariffs in time while also reducing funds 
available to government for social spending. On the other, the Orthodox coalition 
pointed to linkages between economic growth and secure base load supply, argued 
that RE supply was variable, expensive and likely to lead to high tariffs; that 
                                                 
52 Respondents 21-24. 
The politics of electricity planning in South Africa – Brenda Martin 
36 
historically oversupply had led to low tariffs and was less risky. In essence, while the 
Reform coalition pointed to current best practice, risk aversion and future trends, the 
Orthodox coalition pointed to historic trends and the risks of innovation. See Figure 5 
for further detail. 
2. Power sector reform 
On this point, the two coalitions differed significantly. The Reform coalition pointed 
to potential investment savings from distributed supply and better energy efficiency, 
opportunities to achieve policy consistency, best practice planning approaches to 
dealing with uncertainty, global trends, and the economic, intergenerational risks of 
overbuild. The Orthodox coalition argued for economic growth achievable through 
security of supply, that such supply was best met with SA’s coal resources, electricity 
sales revenue streams, pointed to the ease of managing centralised supply, and finally 
argued that diversity of supply does not guarantee security of supply. See Figure 6. 
3. Climate change 
This is a topic where coalition views are not easy to articulate and differentiate. Views 
on climate science are diverse across both coalitions. While members of the Reform 
coalition tend toward treating evidence as a basis for decision-making, not all 
members of this coalition agree on the urgency or methodologies for action. Within 
the Orthodox coalition, views range between scepticism and outright rejection of 
climate-related evidence. While there was a general preference among Reform 
coalition members to err on the side of caution, those who held Orthodox views 
preferred an approach where security of supply was considered to be more important 
than the need for energy policy to take climate policy into account. See Figure 7. 
4. Nuclear power 
While on the whole the Reform coalition advocated against nuclear power and the 
Orthodox coalition for nuclear power, the research revealed that views within 
coalitions were heterogeneous. For example, some Reform coalition members saw 
nuclear power to be an unacceptable supply option regardless of cost, and others who 
held conditional reservations in relation to nuclear power. The latter group 
acknowledged that nuclear power produces lower carbon emissions than coal during 
operations and could therefore be a viable base load alternative to coal, nuclear was 
expensive and decision-making in respect of nuclear tended to lack transparency. 
Among Orthodox coalition members, beliefs on benefits ranged between those who 
saw nuclear as the only viable alternative to coal base load and risks justified, and 
those who argued that nuclear was completely affordable, wholly beneficial and 
presented unlimited economic advantages. See Figure 8. 
5. Renewable energy 
On this point, views between coalitions differed starkly. Members of the Reform 
coalition described the benefits of RE in detail, how such benefits are enhanced when 
coupled with energy efficiency and conservation, and pointed out how vested interests 
tend to undervalue and downplay the potential benefits. Members of the Orthodox 
coalition pointed to RE’s risks, weaknesses and inability to compete with coal and 
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nuclear. While acknowledging a peripheral role for RE, this coalition emphasised that 
it was in no way able to address base load supply needs. See Figure 9 for further 
detail. 
Figures 5 to 9 below provide a more detailed sense of the beliefs of each coalition in respect 
of the five most contested high-level issues. These figures were compiled by the researcher, 
initially on the basis of literature review and her understanding of the sector, then updated for 
accuracy after consultation with respondents and critical reviewers as the research 
progressed. What is presented is thus a synthesis of what has developed through the research.  
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Figure 5: Advocacy issue 1: Tariffs, investment, affordability 
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Figure 6: Advocacy issue 2: Power sector reform 
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Figure 7: Advocacy issue 3: Climate change 
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Figure 8: Advocacy issue 4: Nuclear power 
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Figure 9: Advocacy issue 5: Renewable energy 
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To recap events up to this point: a first round of written public participation had been 
launched by DoE in the second quarter of 2010. This process had led to a second draft IRP, 
favouring a ‘revised balanced scenario’ which was published in October 2010 for public 
engagement at hearings held in Cape Town, KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng. RBS had been 
based on selection of ‘a cost-optimal solution for new build options’ which were then 
‘balanced’ with qualitative measures such as job creation (DoE, 2011). RBS included 
allocations for ‘a nuclear fleet’ of 9.6GW, 6.3GW coal, 11.4GW renewables and 11GW of 
other generation sources (DoE, 2010a). The two coalitions made submissions on a number of 
issues and the five most contested issues highlighted through the research are summarised in 
Figures 5 to 9 above.  
Analysis of how coalitions’ advocacy issues were realised in the promulgated 
IRP2010  
Following a second round of public participation (hearings and written submissions) in 
November and December 2010, changes to the IRP model assumptions were made. The main 
changes reflected in policy included the disaggregation of renewable energy technologies, the 
inclusion of learning rates (both of which affected renewables positively), and the adjustment 
of investment costs for nuclear power upward by about 40%. Additional cost-optimal 
scenarios were generated based on these changes and the outcome of these scenarios, in 
conjunction with ‘policy’ considerations led to the promulgation of a ‘Policy-Adjusted IRP’, 
effectively aimed at ensuring ‘security of supply’ and assisting with ‘fulfilling South Africa’s 
Copenhagen commitments to Climate change’ presented to Cabinet for approval in March 
2011 (DoE, 2011).  
Shortly before the IRP2010 was presented to Cabinet for approval, an ‘external shock’ in the 
form of a nuclear disaster shook the world. Following the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami on 
11 March 2011, level 7 meltdowns took place at three reactors in the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Power Plant complex. This was the largest nuclear disaster since Chernobyl in 1986 
and it would have significant effects on the global nuclear industry. It did not however, cause 
South Africa to change its stated commitment to further investment in nuclear power.  
The final IRP2010 was promulgated in May 2011 and included allocations for: 9.6GW 
nuclear, 17.8GW renewable energy (hydro, wind, CSP, solar PV), 6.3GW new coal capacity 
and 8.9GW ‘other generation’ sources. The ‘policy-adjusted’ scenario referred to the fact that 
although nuclear costs had been automatically rejected by the (least-cost favouring) model for 
all modelled scenarios, a nuclear investment allocation had been manually re-inserted on the 
basis of ‘policy’ (DoE, 2011). In the policy adjusted scenario, the allocated share of coal-
fired power in SA’s electricity mix would decline to 65% by 2030, while the nuclear share 
would increase to 20%. Large hydro was static at 5%, and the differentiated renewables share 
increased to 9%. The overall effect on supply mix would be that RE would make up 42% of 
all newly built capacity by 2030.  
In summary, the main outcomes of the promulgated IRP2010 relating to this research were: 
1. On renewables, investment costs and power sector reform: an increased share for 
renewables (17.8GW, up from 11.4GW in the RBS) based on improved learning rate 
assumptions and technology differentiation. 
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2. On renewables and power sector reform: the installation of renewables (solar PV, 
CSP and wind) were brought forward ‘in order to accelerate a local industry’.  
3. On nuclear power and power sector reform: despite being rejected by the cost-optimal 
model, a ‘nuclear fleet’ of 9.6GW was included ‘to account for the uncertainties 
associated with the costs of renewables and fuels’ and to provide base load power. 
4. On climate change: the emission constraint of the RBS (275 million tons CO2 per 
annum after 2024) was maintained. 
On the promulgated IRP2010, an early conclusion can be made that while the forced 
inclusion of nuclear power allocation proved a major policy ‘win’ for the Orthodox coalition, 
the reduced coal allocation along with the greater RE allocation proved to be two important 
policy ‘wins’ for the Reform coalition. During interviews for this dissertation, the treatment 
of renewable and nuclear power options clearly dominated assessments of due process and 
the trustworthiness of such process. These perceptions would return to prominence with the 
2013 update report process, but at this point in time, decisions in relation to these two supply 
options were already starting to emerge as the most contested of the five selected issues. 
While members of the Reform coalition felt vindicated by the steadily improved reflection of 
learning rates for RE cost assumptions (resulting in a greater share of RE) as well as the 
differentiation of RE technologies, they felt they had lost a major policy battle because of the 
forced inclusion of nuclear. Members of the Orthodox coalition felt vindicated by the forced 
inclusion of nuclear, but felt dissatisfied with the nuclear cost assumptions underpinning this 
policy choice. Nevertheless, it was acknowledged by all respondents that ultimately the 
Orthodox coalition had won a major policy goal: the inclusion of a 9.6GW allocation for 
nuclear power.  
Interestingly, both coalitions were dissatisfied with outcomes relating to demand assumptions 
(linked to issue 1, where demand assumptions informed investment scale) and power sector 
reform (Interviews).53 
Within the promulgated IRP2010, the DoE provided detailed responses to only three of the 
five contested issues highlighted in this research. First, on nuclear power, the DoE’s 
articulated argument aligned with expressed advocacy beliefs of the Orthodox coalition: that 
nuclear power supply provided assurance of security of supply (specifically in the event of 
peak oil-related fuel price increases) and that nuclear power made the most sense for base 
load capacity.  
Secondly, on climate change, although the scenarios indicated that the emissions target 
imposed by RBS should be increased, given the coal-fired generation allocation, the DoE 
opted to retain the RBS emission constraint arguing that coal-fired generation could be 
brought forward by six years and increased the allocation of coal imports. A majority of 
respondents (from both coalitions) felt dissatisfied with this decision: some expressing 
scepticism for the likelihood that new coal build could be accelerated and others pointing out 
that exporting carbon emissions to neighbouring countries would not be a sustainable solution 
(Interviews54).  
                                                 
53 Respondents 6, 7, 11, 13, 21-23; 9, 14, 18, 20. 
54 A view expressed by a majority of respondents. 
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Finally, on power sector reform and climate change, by increasing EEDSM in one of the 
scenarios, it had been shown to be possible to reduce carbon emissions as well as reduce the 
need for additional capacity. However, the DoE felt that the risk to security of supply would 
be negated should the assumed benefits of EEDSM not materialise. Although the point 
linking EEDSM and carbon emissions reduction was interpreted by a majority of respondents 
as a moral victory for the Reform coalition, it ultimately signalled another policy victory for 
the Orthodox coalition in that the allocation for EEDSM was far lower than the Reform 
coalition had been advocating for. Perhaps most significantly, government’s continued 
refusal to acknowledge the declining costs of renewables on input parameters proved to be 
another policy ‘loss’ on issue 5: tariffs, investment, affordability for the Reform coalition 
(DoE, 2010b; Interviews55).  
On the whole, the research concluded that the Orthodox coalition was able to exercise more 
influence on the promulgated IRP2010 than its Reform counterpart. Whether such policy 
wins would stand the test of time was in question for two reasons: 
1. Certain respondents56 noted that, given the differences in lead times for build 
programmes, in time, renewables would be in a position to prove themselves faster 
than nuclear power could be commissioned. Also, the passage of time was expected to 
undermine arguments in favour of nuclear power, as nuclear unit costs were steadily 
rising in build programmes already under way at the same time as global renewable 
unit costs were steadily declining. Whether politics would continue to trump 
information beyond the policy process remained to be seen (Interviews57).  
2. With the forced inclusion of a nuclear power ‘fleet’, it was clear to all respondents 
from the Reform coalition that government had not delivered on its promise to 
prioritise ‘cost-effectiveness’. These respondents also felt that the goal of 
consultative, knowledge-driven (rather than interest-driven) decision-making had not 
been achieved (Interviews58).  
A majority of respondents agreed that government’s commitment to “mitigating uncertainty 
by implementing an IRP review process” and the commitment to a “continued transparent 
public engagement process” was an important outcome of the IRP2010 policy process. These 
views shifted radically for the actual process surrounding the 2013 update report as outlined 
in the next chapter. This chapter has now begun to answer research question 3, and the next 
chapter completes this task. In the timeline, the research has now arrived at mid-2011.  
                                                 
55 A view expressed by a majority of respondents. 
56 Respondents 2, 3, 6, 7, 13, 19, 21-24. 
57 A view expressed by a majority of respondents. 
58 Respondents 6, 7, 11-13, 21-24. 
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Chapter 6: Applying ACF to understand coalitions’ influence on 
the IRP 2013 update report  
The previous chapter considered in some detail how the two selected advocacy coalitions 
engaged with the IRP2010 drafting process, the five most prominent advocacy issues each of 
the coalitions raised, and the DoE’s response to this advocacy engagement. In completing the 
task of answering research question 3, events in the latter part of 2011 are reviewed before 
the 2013 update report process is analysed. The chapter concludes with a review of 
subsequent events to June 2015. The research found that while the consultation process for 
the IRP2010 had been extensive, consisting of two consultation periods before promulgation, 
the IRP2013 did not enjoy similar good governance. In essence, the process involved an 
informal release of a draft update report, with no clarity on the update process undertaken and 
one consultation period. The uptake of public comments was never reported on by 
government, and the IRP2013 update report was not taken up in policy. A key finding of the 
research is that, where the IRP2013 update is concerned, politics – particularly as led by 
government - has decisively undermined planning-related decision-making that is based on 
evidence59.  
Events in the latter part of 2011 
The IRP2010 was promulgated in May 2011. The first DoE request for proposals (RFP) for 
the REIPPPP, marking direct delivery on the RE allocation in the IRP was issued in August 
2011. As described above, this policy event (REIPPPP RFP) had been preceded by a 
protracted and contested process involving government departments, NERSA, Eskom, banks, 
investors and members of both the Orthodox and Reform coalitions (Baker & Wlokas, 2014). 
REIPPPP had an initial policy-linked supply allocation of 3 725MW, but an additional 
3 200MW of capacity was allocated by a Ministerial declaration in December 2012.  
The final deliverable of the NPC, Vision 2030 (also known as the National Development 
Plan), was handed over to the Presidency on 11 November 2011. Public comment was invited 
in March 2012, and the final report was formally launched on 15 August 2012 (Presidency, 
2012). Also in November 2011, an inter-ministerial committee on nuclear energy was 
formed. Named the National Nuclear Energy Executive Coordination Committee (NNEECC) 
and located within the Presidency, the committee was initially chaired by Deputy President 
Kgalema Mothlanthe. In July 2013, President Jacob Zuma dismissed Mothlanthe as his 
deputy, and immediately took control of the NNEECC as its new Chair (Interviews).60 
Speculation at the time was that Zuma had dismissed Mothlanthe because the latter had stood 
for election as ANC President, an election he lost to Zuma.  
Seen from an ACF perspective, at this point in time, sub-system policy change process was 
affected by a combination of broader policy system factors:  
1. External shocks (global financial crisis effects and the Fukushima nuclear disaster);  
2. Increasing domestic civil society activism (public participation in stakeholder 
processes; the rejection of moves by the ANC to introduce a restrictive state secrecy 
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60 Respondents identities fully protected on request. 
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law; justice-related demands for reforms in energy, environment and economic 
policies); and  
3. Growing, organised global social movements aimed at achieving social and economic 
justice through climate-related lifestyle change.  
At the same time, by early 2012 new ministerial determinations allowed for policy process to 
be officially circumvented. One such determination was for the Minister to add 3 200MW of 
RE capacity to the REIPPPP RFP by a Ministerial declaration of December 2012 without 
paying heed to the consultative policymaking process. 
In November 2013, when the two-year IRP update deadline had already passed, and with the 
overdue Integrated Energy Plan (IEP) draft process under way, the DoE invited comment on 
the scheduled update of IRP2010 by February 2014. The Department did this quite informally 
with no prior indication by adding the update report as an agenda item at IEP hearings. The 
main changes were presented verbally, and it was announced that the full update report would 
be published on the DoE’s website, where it continues to be available at the time of writing 
(June 2016) (Researcher records).  
Both coalitions submitted comments on the update report and the DoE made this undertaking 
on its website: “Comments received will be considered in preparing a final draft IRP 2010 
Update which will be submitted to Cabinet for final approval by March 2014. The approved 
document will then be promulgated and be published in the Government Gazette’.  
Even though the update report was never approved by Cabinet, this undertaking still appeared 
on the DoE website at the time of writing in July 2016. Public comments on the IEP draft 
were received and the process closed in February 2014 but, and at the time of writing, no IEP 
had yet been released. 
It is worth noting that during the policy period analysed above, three different Ministers of 
Energy served in President Jacob Zuma’s cabinet, with the shortest appointment being that of 
Ben Martins, who served as Minister of Energy for one year. 
How did the update report differ from the IRP2010? 
Although the process of updating had not been as transparent as the promulgated IRP2010 
policy process had been, the findings of the update report enjoyed wide support from both 
coalitions under review (Interviews61).  
On process, as Winkler (2013) put it in a blog reflecting on the update report: ‘the most 
significant down-side … is on process. IRP 2010 had run a participatory process, with 
opportunities for many stakeholders to make inputs; this was not repeated, with the update 
treated as a technical exercise’. Given that the IRP2013 update report was never approved by 
Cabinet, it is not possible to determine the extent to which the policy advocacy stances of the 
two coalitions have been realised in policy. Some respondents argued that the fact that the 
IRP2013 update report has never been recognised in policy represents ‘non-decision-making’ 
and is a policy ‘win’ for the Orthodox coalition (Interviews62). Nevertheless, the majority of 
respondents were in agreement that the treatment of the IRP2013 update report illustrated 
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62 Respondents 12, 21-24 
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clearly that politics had served to undermine recognition of the value of due process 
(Interviews63). 
While the IRP2010 as promulgated is based on a ‘policy-adjusted, least cost’ single plan to 
deliver a single optimal solution by 2030, the update report was based on a priority of ‘least 
regret’, with multiple scenarios having been modelled. Most significantly, the update report 
included ‘decision trees’ which acknowledged the need to apply a more flexible approach in a 
planning context of uncertainty. The update report was thus considered to be more firmly 
based on evidence, utilising planning best practice methodology and in greater alignment 
with related broader climate and energy policies (Interviews64). 
While recognising the need for lowered demand assumptions based on emerging data, the 
Update utilised the same annual economic growth aspiration as the National Development 
Plan – 5.4%. The IRP2010 contained six scenarios in order to arrive at one set of technology 
allocations for build plans, and had taken into account six demand forecast projections up to 
2034. The update report however, ran several scenarios with several technology mix 
configurations and crucially including four lower-demand forecast scenarios. The planning 
horizon was extended to 2050 (DoE, 2013).  
The supply mix outcomes were that new coal allocations were reduced from 6 250MW to 
2 450MW, the projection for closed cycle gas turbine and open cycle gas turbine capacity 
was increased to 3 550MW (up from 2 370MW in IRP2010) and to 7 680MW (up from 
7 330MW) respectively. Hydropower imports were projected downward to 3 000MW (from 
4 109MW in IRP2010), while solar PV and CSP allocations were increased to 9 770MW 
(8 400MW in IRP2010) and 3 300MW (1 200MW) respectively. Interestingly, the allocation 
for wind decreased from 9 200MW in the IRP2010 to only 4 360MW in the update report. 
On GHG emission trajectories, given the availability of data and in a broad policy context of 
growing awareness of the need for policy to mitigate climate change, the 2013 update went 
into far greater detail than the IRP2010 had done, including consideration per ton of CO2e, 
carbon tax as per the 2013 National Treasury discussion paper and included a section devoted 
to a concept still quite new to climate vernacular at the time – carbon budget – advocating 
treatment of an emission allowance for the electricity sector as a constraint to 2050, instead of 
an annual limit on carbon tax. The update also included clear policy guidance on nuclear 
procurement, linked to demand, investment cost and the availability of other supply options 
(DoE, 2013).  
Analysis of advocacy coalition beliefs reflected in the IRP 2013 update report 
A majority of respondents interviewed agreed that the IRP2013 report was significantly more 
than an update. Given the significant shift in planning methodology applied, particularly in 
relation to planning in uncertainty, as well as the focus on evidence rather than politics, in 
essence it was viewed as a new plan, with little resemblance to the IRP2010 as promulgated 
(Interviews65). Recognition of the need to take account of uncertainty affected all of the 
contested issues highlighted by this dissertation: investment affordability, power sector 
reform, climate change, nuclear and RE, all of which would result in knock-on effects for 
                                                 
63 View expressed by a majority of respondents. 
64 A view expressed by a majority of respondents. 
65 A view expressed by a majority of respondents. 
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allocated investments. The analysis now resumes a focus on the five most contested advocacy 
issues put forward by the Reform and the Orthodox coalitions before in concluding this 
chapter, what emerged as the two most contested issues within the update report are 
considered in greater detail.  
The potential for shale gas, other gas developments in the region, the likely mitigation 
imperatives for SA as part of a global agenda to combat climate change, nuclear costs and 
future fuel costs for gas and coal were all noted as elements of uncertainty in the Update 
report. Given this, DoE understood the need for a flexible approach, rather than the fixed 
capacity plan outcome of the IRP2010. Applying an innovative planning approach, and 
advocating a methodology also known as the ‘decision tree approach’, the update presented 
determinants to be considered for investment decisions and provided recommendations on 
which investments should be considered under different conditions, as these arose. This 
approach would potentially be relevant to all five contested advocacy issues, particularly 
issue 2: power sector reform and issue 3: climate change. 
Respondent views on the net effects of the flexible approach were predictably complex, but 
interestingly (from the perspective of politics) also signalled the start of an unfolding shifting 
of alliances between coalitions. While members of both coalitions disagreed on whether the 
net effect of decision tree methodology proved to be a win for either coalition, specific 
aspects within the outcomes of this approach were supported within both coalitions. For 
example, some respondents from the Reform coalition saw the acknowledgement of 
uncertainty on nuclear costs and future fuel costs for coal and gas as an opportunity for power 
sector reform via a decisive shift away from both coal and nuclear due to the assumption that 
learning about the value of RE would be self-evident within a year or two (Interviews66). 
Meanwhile, some respondents from the Orthodox coalition started to see the rationale for 
limited power sector reform in that they saw this as an opportunity to argue for shifting the 
base load mix towards a greater share for gas, rather than a greater share for RE 
(Interviews67).  
Another example of inter-coalition agreement was that while a majority of respondents from 
both coalitions agreed that a decision tree approach was a sensible methodology for planning 
in conditions of uncertainty, respondents from both coalitions also expressed the concern that 
this would add to an existing climate of policy uncertainty and leave all sectors with 
insufficient assurance of long-term investment certainty and exposing all sectors to the risk of 
underdevelopment (Interviews68). Nevertheless, on the issue of power sector reform, a 
majority of respondents felt that between the IRP2010 process and the update report, the two 
coalitions had moved closer to convergence in their advocacy positions (Interviews69). 
An example of differences both within and among coalitions was on the issue of gas supply. 
While during the IRP2010 process gas supply had not surfaced as a point of contestation, 
given the update report’s treatment of gas, gas supply now became a significant issue. The 
research confirmed that a majority of Reform coalition respondents were not in favour of 
shale gas exploration, seeing this technology as part of what one respondent described as ‘a 
                                                 
66 Respondents 7, 11, 13 
67 Respondents 8, 10, 15 
68 Respondents 9, 12, 14, 26 
69 A view supported by a majority of respondents. 
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set of unsustainable technology solutions we need to move away from once and for all!’ 
(Interviews70). However, unlike the emerging convergence of beliefs between the two 
coalitions in relation to renewable energy, there was strong divergence on the issue of gas 
supply.  
The Orthodox coalition showed a clear willingness to opt for pragmatism with regard to gas 
supply. Some respondents from this coalition maintained the view that ‘energy investment 
decisions should not be trumped by climate decisions, but if gas works as base load and it has 
a better emissions profile than coal and is more acceptable than nuclear, then we should 
explore this.’ Interestingly, this pragmatism now extended to issue 3, climate change in that 
these same respondents. While they maintained the view that security of energy supply 
should be prioritised over climate policy, they conceded that even if global pressures on SA 
to address climate imperatives grew, nuclear would be a better solution than any of the other 
technology options (Interviews71). Members of the Reform coalition held differing degrees of 
support for gas supply. Views ranged between outright rejection and a preference for gas over 
new coal and nuclear supply. 
An issue which related indirectly to issue 1, specifically investment, was the demand 
assumptions that informed investment choice. IRP2010 had been based on a fixed demand 
assumption of 454 TWh, but the update report projected a range of between 345 and 
416 TWh. The result was an anticipated investment capacity requirement of no more than 
61 200MW (on the upper end of the range), i.e. at least 6 600MW less capacity would be 
required. The Reform coalition had called for reduced demand assumption since the initial 
IRP draft early in 2010, linking this to a smaller investment requirement and reduced risk on 
tariff affordability into the future. The 2013 update report differed greatly from the IRP2010 
in that its treatment of the issue of energy demand was acknowledged by a majority of 
respondents as an important policy win for the Reform coalition. Acknowledging the trend 
toward reduced demand between 2010 and 2012 and the related risk of generation over-build, 
the assumptions related to demand were significantly lowered and furthermore, a range of 
demand was included in the 2013 update. During interviews, while members of the Orthodox 
coalition retained the view that economic growth could be driven by security of supply, it was 
agreed that within the coalition the focus of contestation had shifted from a broad push for 
base load supply and against renewables, to a growing concern in relation to the political 
currents surrounding nuclear power investment (Interviews).72 Also, respondents from both 
coalitions pointed out that this shift in emphasis and advocacy attention ultimately diluted 
advocacy efforts against renewables and allowed renewables to flourish under the REIPPPP 
(Interviews).73  
On the whole, the research found through majority view that the Reform coalition had 
realised more policy ‘wins’ in the IRP update report (Interviews74). 
Having considered how the most contested issues were reflected in the update, along with 
coalition responses, the analysis now shifts to focus on what finally emerged as the two most 
                                                 
70 A view expressed by 6 out of the 9 Reform coalition respondents. 
71 Respondents 9, 14, 18. 
72 Respondents 6, 8, 9, 14. 
73 Respondents 2, 3, 7, 8, 13 
74 A view expressed by a majority of respondents. 
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contested issues of supply, one increasingly less contested in advocacy but with an interesting 
intra-coalition shift (renewable energy), and the other found to signal greater alignment 
between the two coalitions’ advocacy agendas (nuclear power).  
Renewable energy 
In the update report, Solar PV and CSP allocations were increased to 9 770MW (compared to 
8 400MW in IRP2010) and 3 300MW (1 200MW) respectively, and the allocation for wind 
decreased from 9 200MW to only 4 360MW in the 2013 update. While for the update report 
members of the Reform coalition claimed a policy ‘win’ on the increased allocations for in 
Solar PV and CSP (particularly given CSP’s potential contribution to base load capacity), it 
was unclear why government had chosen to decrease the allocation for wind.  
Some Reform coalition respondents speculated that there was an unstated overall policy ‘cap’ 
on RE, and that wind had been a casualty of the increased share for CSP and solar PV; that 
the wind lobby was unpopular with government and was being ‘punished’; that wind 
technology itself was unpopular among South African citizens and government was counting 
on public support to hide what was perceived as a unilateral policy choice (Interviews75).  
A view expressed by some respondents from both coalitions and which relates 
simultaneously to the shifts of allegiances between coalitions, while also presenting a new 
facet of intra-coalition politics unfolding relates to the suggestion that the reduced wind 
allocation set off the start of a de facto split within the Reform coalition. As one respondent 
put it: ‘it was in the wind sector’s interest that the 2013 update report not be realised in 
policy’ (Interviews76).  
An important shift between coalition member beliefs related to costs. It was clear that RE 
costs had declined dramatically since IRP2010 promulgation. This led to some Orthodox 
coalition members aligning their beliefs relating to ‘least cost’, with the Reform coalition. In 
essence, this meant that these coalition members gave up support for Nuclear power 
(Interviews77). 
Nuclear power 
The update report’s view on the IRP2010’s nuclear build allocation was by far the most 
contested of all matters it raised. Given that the update report called for a more cautious 
approach to nuclear power investment, a majority of respondents expressed the view that this 
was in fact the key reason for the update not making it into policy (Interviews78).  
It is worth quoting the IRP2013 update report on this point fully here: 
‘The nuclear decision can possibly be delayed. The revised demand projections 
suggest that no new base load capacity is required until after 2025 (and for lower 
demand not until at least 2035) and that there are alternative options, such as regional 
hydro, that can fulfil the requirement and allow further exploration of the shale gas 
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77 Respondents 8, 15, 21 
78 A view held by a majority of respondents. 
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potential before prematurely committing to a technology that may be redundant if the 
electricity demand expectations to not materialise.’  
(IRP 2013 update report executive summary)  
In addition, nuclear costs were still assumed, as a central case, at a low $5 800/kW, but 
crucially the sensitivity analysis tested the amount at $7 000/kW. Furthermore, the update 
suggested that even if demand grew by 2015 and there was ultimately no prospect of shale-
gas power, that if nuclear costs in 2015 exceed $6 500/kW, then ‘the procurement programme 
should be abandoned’. While clearly signalling the prudence of delay, and pointing to 
emerging demand figures as well as supply alternatives, the update report articulated a clear 
policy approach to deciding on nuclear procurement. This resulted in some Orthodox 
coalition members shifting beliefs to echo that of the Reform coalition, on Costs 
(Interviews79). 
On the issue of nuclear power, interviewed respondents themselves mainly stood by their 
respective coalition beliefs i.e. pro-nuclear (Orthodox coalition) and anti-nuclear (Reform 
coalition). But, interestingly, there were two key points of agreement among a majority of 
respondents which suggested that coalition loyalties had shifted, as a direct result of 
perceived politics (Interviews80): 
1. That the lack of transparency and accountability on nuclear power investment 
decision-making was unacceptable, regardless of a pro- or anti-nuclear position; 
2. The growing (and subsequently influential) support of the President for the nuclear 
new build programme had been visible within the policy sub-system from at least 
June 2010, had likely driven the ‘policy-adjusted’ IRP2010 forced inclusion of 
nuclear, and had sustained its subsequent pursuit despite the 2013 update report 
findings. 
On point 2 above, it was evident from interviews that a majority of respondents – across 
coalitions, saw the President’s political support for the nuclear programme as integral to its 
progress, as well as stimulating the parallel closing down of the consultative nature of SA’s 
electricity planning process by mid-2014 (Interviews81).  
In 2014, Sovacool et al assessed the construction costs affiliated with 401 electricity 
infrastructure projects worldwide and found that these projects collectively incurred $388 
billion in cost overruns, equivalent to a mean cost escalation of $968 million per project, or a 
66.3 percent budget overrun per project, and with nuclear projects presenting a mean cost 
escalation of 117%. Such evidence was increasingly entering the public domain by mid-2014. 
Subsequent events to June 2015 
In June 2014, the Presidency announced that a cabinet Energy Security Sub-Committee had 
been established to ‘oversee the development of SA’s future energy mix’. This initiative, the 
Presidency said ‘would replace the NNEECC’ (Presidency, 2014). The ESSC included 
ministers from the following departments: Defence, Economic Development, Energy, 
Environmental Affairs, Finance, International Relations & Co-operation, Mineral Resources, 
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80 Views held by a majority of respondents. 
81 A view supported by a majority of respondents. 
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Public Enterprises, State Security, and Trade & Industry. As part of a range of technical 
committees, a nuclear energy technical committee led by various departmental Directors-
General would still report to the ministers on the sub-committee, as would a nuclear energy 
working group led by senior officials and including technical experts from the private sector. 
Respondents involved in the process pointed out that while ministerial representation had 
changed and President Zuma had taken over leadership from the Deputy President Kgalema 
Mothlanthe, in practice the original structure and focus of the NNEECC was fully maintained 
in the ESSC (Interviews;82 Eskom, 2015). A copy of the NNEECC structure provided by 
Eskom in 2015 is included as Figure 10 below and confirms that the structure remained 
formally unchanged. In fact, the original committee name was still being used by the 
members of this inter-ministerial structure in 2015.  
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Figure 10: The structure of the NNEECC/ESSC  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Eskom, March 2015) 
It can be inferred from the above, that by March 2015 there was no structural change to any 
of the structures for or the people who had been appointed to support the NNEECC inherited 
by the renamed committee (Eskom, 2015; confirmed in Interviews83).  
While cost overruns and construction delays have characterised South Africa’s recent large 
coal-fired power plant build programmes Medupi and Kusile, Medupi’s Unit 6 achieved a full 
load of 800MW following its first synchronisation in March 2015, and became commercially 
operational in August 2015. Once completed, Medupi and Kusile will contribute 9 564MW 
of new coal-derived base load power to the national grid.  
By the end of March 2015 Eskom, had contracted capacity of 5 701MW from independent 
power producers, and a total of 6 327MW from 92 projects awarded in five bidding rounds. 
The 92 projects represented a total investment of R192 billion, of which approximately R53 
billion was through direct foreign investment (Treasury, 2015). The REIPPPP was not only 
providing evidence of the view held by the Reform coalition that RE was quicker to construct 
and that learning would drive down costs, reliable data was presented by the Council for 
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Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) that RE was contributing to SA’s economy and 
contributing to savings on diesel fuel during the electricity crisis (CSIR, 2015). 
In the meantime, momentum toward a procurement process for the nuclear new build 
programme continued to grow, with the Presidency and the Minister of Energy consistently 
indicating that nuclear investment was ‘non-negotiable’. This was despite growing evidence 
from nuclear build programmes already under way that the IRP2010 estimate of $5800/kW 
was a significantly underestimate, with comparative programmes already costing between 
$8 000 and $10 000/ kW by late 2014 (Thomas, 2014).  
In conclusion, by June 2015, much had changed within SA’s social, economic and political 
context, with significant implications for its five-year old electricity plan, the IRP2010. 
Electricity demand had continued to decline, the costs of investment for nuclear and gas had 
both increased sharply, and tariffs continued to rise. A fourth annual round of country-wide 
rolling blackouts was resulting in a new national electricity supply crisis with knock-on 
economic effects. The 2013 Update report was not recognised in policy and no further update 
of the IRP2010 was forthcoming. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and implications 
Applying the advocacy coalition framework theory, research and analysis of literature and 
empirical evidence from key stakeholder interviews has been undertaken. Initial key findings 
were shared with a small number of experts for critical comment before the researcher 
finalised this dissertation. 
Chapter 1 introduced the dissertation, the research questions, the basic attributes of the 
problem area in the context of South Africa’s energy sector, and then delved into the 
electricity sector and its policy sub-system. Chapter 2 introduced the ACF theoretical 
framework and how it has been applied in this dissertation. Chapter 3 developed an 
understanding of the policy sub-system by reflecting via an ACF lens on the evolution of 
SA’s electricity policy, how the reviewed coalitions have emerged, and key policy events 
relating to electricity planning. This review included what ACF describes as ‘system shocks’ 
i.e. related events that have far-reaching effects on unfolding policy.  
Chapter 4 then stepped away from the history, to introduce the two coalitions under review 
and what emerged as five dominant contested beliefs reflected in advocacy positions relevant 
to the IRP process. Chapter 5 focused on the policy event at the core of the dissertation: the 
IRP2010, introducing electricity planning practice, the draft policy and what DoE emphasised 
within it. What the Coalitions specifically advocated for within the five selected themes, was 
analysed. The promulgated IRP was then considered, with a view to assessing how the 
advocated issues of coalitions were reflected in policy. At this point, evidence of the 
influence of politics on planning, was emerging.  
Chapter 6 analysed the IRP2013 as well as subsequent related events, highlighting how the 
update report differed from the IRP2010 and which issues then emerged as most contested. 
The chapter concluded with consideration of two emerging issues of contestation out of the 
five previously highlighted: renewable energy and nuclear power. It presented a few 
illustrated inter and intra coalition shifts. At this point evidence of the influence of politics on 
planning was confirmed, particularly on the issues of nuclear power investment and non-
recognition of the update report in policy. 
The research set out to answer the following questions: 
1. From the IRP2010 to its 2013 update report, which were the dominant coalitions 
seeking to influence planning?  
2. What were the dominant advocacy issues raised by these coalitions?  
3. What evidence could be found for how the issues of dominant advocacy coalitions 
were realised in electricity policy?  
4. What can be concluded and what are the implications for future electricity planning? 
Chapter 4, 5 and 6 have sought to answer the first three questions. This chapter now draws 
conclusions and points to implications for electricity planning, in order to answer the final 
question.  
Application of ACF has made it possible to identify that within the SA electricity sector two 
high-level coalitions have dominated the IRP2010 process and its 2013 update: one favouring 
orthodox solutions to power supply, and the other favouring transition to a reformed power 
sector with similar supply models and decision-making.  
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The members of the identified coalitions have been mapped and studied, based on the core 
beliefs they have advocated. The advocated beliefs of the Orthodox coalition have been 
echoed by influential members of government throughout the policy process under review. 
The coalition has thus been found to be more politically influential. Despite its beliefs and 
advocated issues being more visible in the 2013 update report, the Reform coalition has been 
found to be less politically influential. 
While the promulgated electricity plan reflects wins and losses to both coalitions, in the final 
analysis more evidence has been found of policy ‘wins’ for the Orthodox coalition. Such 
wins can be attributed to the absence of decision-making, particularly in relation to the 2013 
update report and the resulting policy activities relating to nuclear power. 
For the IRP 2013 update report, analysis of policy beliefs, wins and losses became more 
complex, both with alliances shifting within and between the two coalitions under review and 
with the update report’s continued lack of recognition in policy. The influential role of 
government, particularly the Presidency, on the nuclear investment decision is perceived to 
have begun in earnest, in June 2010 and this view is supported by the continued lack of 
recognition in policy, of the 2013 update report.  
The clear political support of government for nuclear power procurement has resulted in 
increasingly united inter-coalition advocacy against nuclear power, as well as reduced inter-
coalition advocacy against renewable energy.  
It has also been found that non-recognition of the IRP2013 update report in policy has 
benefited both wind power and nuclear power procurement. If the update report had resulted 
in changes to the promulgated IRP, the allocation for wind would have been reduced 
significantly, and the nuclear procurement decision delayed, pending emerging demand and 
cost data. While the IRP2010 has not been updated, renewable power supply has been 
making an increasing contribution to the national electricity supply mix.  
Nevertheless, a majority of respondents felt that ultimately the delay in the promulgation of a 
well-regarded, technically robust updated IRP threatens confidence in electricity planning 
processes.  
At the time of writing (August 2016), despite evidence of growing RE competitiveness and 
the escalating costs of nuclear power, a majority of Orthodox coalition advocacy beliefs are 
reflected in formal policy guiding investment decisions. In addition, despite evidence that 
Reform coalition advocacy positions in relation to renewable energy supply and nuclear 
investment affordability in particular are proving themselves in practice, these views are 
largely ignored in the official electricity plan as promulgated in 2010.  
Some implications of these conclusions are now presented. 
Based on the above conclusions, the reader is reminded of the intentions underpinning 
Integrated Resource Planning in South Africa. The long-term planning goal for IRP2010 is to 
ensure sustainable development considering technical, economic and social constraints as 
well as externalities. Its short-term purpose is the identification of the requisite investments in 
the electricity sector that maximise the national interest at minimum present-day cost (DoE, 
2010a). Government’s primary commitment is thus to growing access to electricity in both 
the short term and the long term. In addition, as the DoE stated at the IRP public hearings in 
November/December 2010: ‘The IRP has to provide insight into how South Africa can 
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deliver the requisite energy to fuel growth in the economy AND do so in a manner which is 
affordable and ensures South Africa remains internationally competitive’(DoE, 2010a). 
While differing on many points relating to how it may be achieved, the two coalitions under 
review agreed that electricity access is an essential aspect of addressing South Africa’s many 
socio-economic challenges. Specifically, respondents agreed that electricity access is an 
essential means to achieving and sustaining national economic prosperity (Interviews84).  
As Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) have found, while prosperity cannot be engineered, one 
of the key features of economies achieving common, sustained prosperity, is the existence of 
inclusive economic and political institutions. Having considered a diverse range of global 
historical examples, they concluded that regardless of the planning choices made, when 
decision-making is transparent and consultative, when planning in uncertainty includes 
regular opportunities for review and when innovation is encouraged and political power 
distributed, nations have a greater chance of achieving prosperity. 
As a nation committed to future prosperity and which sees electricity access as essential to 
such prosperity, South Africa cannot afford the social nor economic costs of stranded assets 
or major cost overruns. The responsibility to future generations, to limit risk exposure, 
particularly in relation to tariffs and costs of finance, is a significant one. As Steyn (2006) has 
pointed out, given that previous experience of investment expansion was seriously flawed, 
care should be taken to avoid committing irreversibly to expensive, large scale and inflexible 
energy technology under an atmosphere of crisis and political pressure. Affordable access to 
electricity is about more than physical access to the grid. In order to utilise such services and 
achieve socio-economic development, affordability is key (Winkler et al, 2011).  
If access to electricity is taken as an essential contributor to broad prosperity, and within this 
that affordability is a key priority, then updating the national electricity plan, by taking into 
account the evidence of relevant sub-system changes that have occurred since 2010 is urgent. 
That such a process should ideally be consultative, transparent and evidence based, rather 
than driven by politics, is supported by the findings of this research.   
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Annexures 
Annexure 1: Informed consent and interview outline (for UCT ethics purposes) 
 
Dear respondent, 
My name is Brenda Martin and I am conducting research towards a Masters’ degree in Energy & 
Development at the University of Cape Town. I provide details of my research below. 
Please understand that your participation in this interview is voluntary. The choice to participate is yours 
alone. If you choose not to participate, there will be no negative consequence. If you choose to proceed but 
wish to withdraw at any time, you will be free to do so. However, I would be grateful if you would allow 
me to interview you. Some additional points to note: 
• The interview should not take longer than 1 hour in total.  
• I will record your answers in summary form and you will be given the opportunity to confirm that 
I have understood you correctly.  
• As far as I am aware, there is no direct benefit or harm attached to your agreeing to participate in 
this interview. 
• Confidentiality will be maintained as per our agreement at the conclusion of the interview. 
• All data relating to my research will be utilised for the purposes of completing my dissertation 
only. 
• A copy of my finalised dissertation can be made available to you, on request. 
 
Research Outline 
The politics of electricity planning in South Africa: a review of the dominant advocacy coalitions seeking 
to influence the Integrated Resource Plan of 2010 (IRP2010), and its update in 2013. 
Research questions  
1. From the IRP2010 to its 2013 Update report, which were the dominant coalitions seeking to 
influence planning? This question will identify the dominant coalitions and their members, 
including main actors. 
2. What were the dominant advocacy issues raised by these coalitions? This question will identify 
the core issues of only the dominant coalitions, for analysis. 
3. What evidence could be found for how the issues of dominant advocacy coalitions were realised 
in electricity policy?  
4. What can be concluded and what are the implications for future electricity planning? 
Purpose of the study 
To analyse the politics of electricity planning in South Africa, and in doing so review the dominant 
advocacy coalitions seeking to influence the Integrated Resource Plan of 2010 (IRP2010), and its update in 
2013. 
 
Themes we may cover in the interview: 
• The governance framework for electricity planning in South Africa.  
• The role of institutions in electricity planning. 
• The active coalitions within the electricity sector 
• Decision-making in uncertainty 
• The IRP2010 (draft and promulgated) 
• The IRP2013 Update report 
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Annexure 2: Interview schedule 
Respondent interviews selected for analysis 
Name Coalition/Organisation at the 
time 
Interview 
method 
Initial 
findings 
critical 
respondent 
Respondent 1 DoE Skype • 
Respondent 2 DoE Skype  
Respondent 3 NERSA Meeting  
Respondent 4 DEA  Phone  
Respondent 5 Technical advisor to 
NNEECC/ESCSC 
Phone • 
Respondent 6 Reform coalition Email • 
Respondent 7 Reform coalition Phone  
Respondent 8 Orthodox coalition Meeting • 
Respondent 9 Orthodox coalition Phone  
Respondent 
11 
Reform coalition Skype  
Respondent 
12 
Reform coalition Meeting • 
Respondent 
13 
Reform coalition Meeting  
Respondent 
14 
Orthodox coalition Meeting  
Respondent 
15 
Orthodox coalition Meeting • 
Respondent 
16 
Parliament Meeting  
Respondent 
17 
Orthodox coalition Meeting  
Respondent 
18 
Orthodox coalition Meeting • 
Respondent 
19 
Orthodox coalition Meeting  
Respondent 
20 
Orthodox coalition Meeting  
Respondent 
21 
Reform coalition Meeting • 
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Respondent 
22 
Reform coalition Meeting  
Respondent 
23 
Reform coalition Phone  
Respondent 
24 
Reform coalition Meeting  
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Annexure 3: Ethics clearance 
